MC 327/1 (Military Decision)

23 October 1997

MILITARY DECISION ON MC 327/1

MILITARY CONCEPT FOR NATO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1 . On 20 Oct 97 the Military Committee endorsed MC 327/1 - Military Concept for NATO Peace Support Operations.

2.   The document is forwarded to the Secretary General for notation by the MC. Pending further guidance, the MC will revisit the issue for further update. Unless otherwise guided, MC 327/1 will be released to the WEU and Partners.

3.   This document clears IMSWM-313-97(SD1), 15 Oct 97 and replaces MC 327, 6 Aug 93.

FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:

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Enclosure

1 .   MC 32711 - Military Concept for NATO Peace Support Operations, 20 Oct 97.

<u>Distribution</u> SDL Z

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<u>NATO UNCLASSIFIED</u>

ENCLOSURE 1 to
MC 327/1 (Military Decision)

<u>NATO UNCLASSIFIED</u>

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQU DU NORD
NATO Headquarters
Boulevard Leopold III - B-1110 Bruxelles

20 Oct 1997   **MC 32711**

MILITARY CONCEPT FOR NATO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

<u>References</u>

A.   MC 6417, 28 Jul 95.

B.   MC 133/2(Revised), 2 Dec 96.

C.   MC 319/1 (under development).

D.   MC 326, 20 Jan 93.

E.   MC 327, 6 Aug 93.

F.   MC 334, 18 Apr 94.

G. MC 336/1 (under development).

H. MC 348, 12 Oct 95.

1. MC 362 (under development).

J. MC 389, 16 Jan 97.

K. MC 400/1, 14 Jun 96.

L. MC 402, 7 Apr 97.

M. MC 411 (under development).

INTRODUCTION

1 . <u>Purpose</u>. The purpose of this document is to provide a conceptual reference to guide the planning and conduct of Peace Support Operations (PSO) within NATO, with Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations, and other nations and organisations as appropriate. It also provides the basis for the MNCs' to develop and refine the BI-MNC Directive for NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations. It also applies to Alliance support to similar operations led by other organisations, in particular the WEU in accordance with the arrangements agreed between the respective organisations.

BACKGROUND

2. The <u>Changing Security Environment</u>. The changing security environment is increasingly characterised by various forms of complex, multi-party, intrastate conflicts and resulting humanitarian disasters which might constitute multidimensional risks or threats to regional and international security. Such conflicts are usually fought not only by regular armies but also by militias and armed civilians. As a result, state institutions collapse, law and order break down, banditry and chaos prevail and the civilian population flee the conflict region or the country. Therefore, international activities to restore peace must include political,
diplomatic, military and humanitarian efforts to promote national reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government. Such complex contingencies require a composite and multifunctional response involving various political, military, civilian and humanitarian authorities under a single political leadership, such as the United Nations, as well as the involvement of regional and sub-regional organisations, governments, supra-national organisations external to the region and nongovernment aid agencies. lntrastate conflicts have the potential to extend over several years, and require timely and well-adjusted activities and contributions by all parties involved in order to achieve the political objective. While retaining its primary defensive posture, NATO's new strategic concept covered in MC 40011 acknowledges these new multi-dimensional risks and challenges.

3. United <u>Nations</u>. The first article of the UN Charter states that its main purpose is "to maintain international peace and security". The Charter provides the terms of reference for the

various elements of the UN, and for regional arrangements and agencies in fulfilling this responsibility. Although the Charter makes no specific reference to PSO, the three chapters which most relate to PSO are: Chapter VI which deals with the pacific settlement of disputes, Chapter Vii which refers to enforcement actions and measures, and Chapter Viii which deals with regional arrangements. Since within the UN the Security Council is the body responsible for maintaining international peace and security, PS0s are, therefore, established through resolutions of the Security Council. Alliance support of or involvement in PS0s must be within the provisions of the UN Charter. Alliance action will be in response to relevant UN Security Council mandates.

4.   Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Since its inception, the OSCE has served as an important forum for the reduction of international tension and the establishment of arms reduction and arms control measures. The members of the OSCE have demonstrated their commitment to security, stability and the peaceful settlement of disputes and the OSCE has now developed procedures and institutions to promote peaceful settlements under the UN Charter. As a regional arrangement under Chapter Vii of the UN Charter the OSCE has made clear its willingness to participate in, conduct or lead PS0s under Chapter VI in appropriate situations. Alliance action will be in response to relevant OSCE mandates and will be conducted in accordance with NATO policies.

5.   Western European Union (WEU). Arrangements for the use of Alliance assets and capabilities in WEU-led PS0s is an essential element of the developing European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO. In light of the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, the linkage between NATO and WEU will be directly tied to the Petersberg tasks for PSO. In the planning for these missions, assets and capabilities to be used in WEU-led operations will be identified. Additional European command arrangements within NATO will take full advantage of the CJTF concept, in order to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations.

6.   Alliance Commitment to PS0s.

   a. During the Oslo Ministerial on 4 Jun 92 and at the NAC Ministerial on 17 Dec 92, the NAC agreed to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping operations under the authority of either the UN or the OSCE.

b.   At the NAC Ministerial on 10 Jun 93 in Athens, Ministers confirmed the principles for Alliance support of peacekeeping mentioned above, and at the NACC Ministerial on 11 Jun 93, Ministers welcomed the report of the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, which set out a common understanding on conceptual approaches and a common programme for practical peacekeeping arrangements in cooperation with Partners. A followon to the Athens Report which referred to multi-functional peacekeeping operations was endorsed by Ministers in Dec 95.

C.   The CJTF Concept. The Jan 94 Brussels Summit directed the NAC to develop the CJTF Concept to facilitate a more effective and flexible conduct of all Alliance missions, including

PS0s, in cooperation with Partners as envisaged under the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The Jun 95 Defence Ministers Meeting affirmed this decision and underlined the inclusion of operations under UN or OSCE authority. The Jun 96 Foreign Ministers Meeting confirmed the CJTF concept as being central to the Alliance approach for assembling forces for and organising command of contingency operations. In addition, with the goal of building ESDI within NATO, Ministers confirmed that arrangements should permit WEU-led operations, including PSO, using NATO assets and capabilities and permit all European Allies to play a larger role in command arrangements as appropriate. MC 389, the "MC Directive for the Implementation of the Alliance's CJTF Concept", which directed the MNCs to create a CJTF HQ capability as soon as practicable, was approved by the Council in DEC 96.

d.   At their meeting on 30 May 97 in Sintra, Ministers decided to establish and inaugurate the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Additionally, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council and NATO-Ukraine Commission were also established. The expanded political dimension of consultation and cooperation will allow Partners to develop a direct political relationship individually or in groups with the Alliance. The respective documents allow meetings in a limited format between the Alliance and groups of Partners who participate with NATO in a PSO, and provide Partners with the opportunity to consult on issues related to PS0s.

TERMINOLOGY

7.   Definitions.

    a.   Peace Support Operations. PS0s are multi-functional operations conducted impartially in support of a UNI/OSCE mandate involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies and are designed to achieve a long term political settlement or other conditions specified in the mandate. They include peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations.

b.   Peacekeeping (PK). PK operations are generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and are conducted with the consent of all Parties to a conflict to monitor and facilitate implementation of a peace agreement.

C.   Peace Enforcement (PE). PE operations are undertaken under Chapter Vii   of the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the   consent of all Parties to a conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate.

d.   Conflict Prevention. Activities aimed at conflict prevention are normally conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. They range from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployments of forces intended to prevent disputes from escalating to armed conflicts or from

spreading. Conflict prevention can also include fact finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections and monitoring.

Preventive Deployment. Preventive deployments within the framework of conflict prevention is the deployment of operational forces possessing sufficient deterrence capabilities to prevent an outbreak of hostilities.

e.   Peacemaking. Peacemaking covers the diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation and such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation or sanctions.

f.   Peace Building. Peace Building covers actions which support political, economic, social and military measures and structures aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress the causes of a conflict. This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures which tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction.

g.   Humanitarian Operations. Humanitarian **operations are conducted to** alleviate human suffering. Humanitarian **operations may precede or** accompany humanitarian activities **provided by specialised** civilian **organisations.**

8. Peacekeeping (PK) versus Peace Enforcement (PE)

a.   General. In determining whether a mission should be undertaken as a PK or a PE operation, a thorough estimate should be made of the operational conditions including the likely level of consent of the parties in conflict to any intervening Peace Support Force (PSF), and their attitudes both to each other and to any peace process. If a peace process has been agreed by the parties in conflict, and it is considered that there is a genuine will and intention to abide by any agreement, a PK posture may be appropriate, based on the full and clearly demonstrated consent of the parties. In the event that there is either little inclination by the parties in conflict to agree to any peace process, or having done so it is considered that there is a strong possibility that they will renege on, or ignore, the agreements, then a PE posture may be more appropriate.

b.   PK Operations. PK should focus on those techniques which maintain and   promote consent as any loss of consent will limit the freedom of action of the   PK force and continuation of the mission. Impartiality and the minimum use   of force should guide PK operations.

C.   PE Operations. PE differs from war in that military victory is not the ultimate measure of success. PE operations are coercive in nature, using force or the threat of force, if needed, to maintain or re-establish peace or to enforce the terms of the mandate. However, the long term demands of peace will require that coercive techniques are used with restraint and in conjunction with other techniques designed to promote cooperation and consent. The strategy for achieving this must be clearly communicated to the parties in conflict in order to contribute to success.

Therefore a PE force must be organised, equipped, trained and deployed to achieve its operational objectives. Should the conflicting parties not be deterred and fail to comply with the mandate, the PE force must be able to react adequately, based upon robust Rules of Engagement (ROE).

d.   Transition from PK to PE. A PK force, which generally is lightly armed, can not be given enforcement tasks. If a situation occurs where PK transits to PE, the only option for a PK force may be to withdraw or attempt to make a deliberate transition to PE provided that a new mandate has been given by the UNSC. However, a PK force can only make the transition to PE provided that the necessary preparations have been made beforehand. When a PK force converts to PE, this requires a deliberate policy decision taking account of the risks involved.

e.   Transition from PE to PK. The aim of any PE force should be to conduct itself so judiciously as to allow the force to lower its operational profile to one more akin to PK as soon as judged appropriate. The transition from PE to PK will be driven by local events and will thus require the gradual introduction of PK techniques. For a PE force which is able to adopt a PK profile after deployment, a reversion to PE would be of less significance.

THE NATURE OF PS0s

9.   General Elements of PS0s. Multi-dimensional PS0s encompass both elements of traditional PK and new tasks. Without being exhaustive, these could include:

a. The control and verification of compliance with peace agreements, cease-fire agreements or armistices.

b.   Assistance to fulfilling agreements on peaceful settlements of a conflict.

C.   Preventative troop **presence.**

d.   Guarantee **of** or denial **of** movement,   -

e.   Mineclearing.

f.   Demilitarisation and/or demobilisation operations, including those involving foreign military personnel.

g.   Supporting humanitarian relief and **assistance** operations to civilian populations, including **refugees.**

h.   Supporting development assistance.

i. Supporting human rights monitoring, protection and restoration.

j.   Assisting in organising and monitoring elections.

k.   Assisting in the restoration of civil order and the rule of **law.**

1. Assisting in the coordination of activities supporting economic
rehabilitation and reconstruction.

10.   The Challenge of PS0s. PS0s are to achieve a well-defined objective as described in the mandate. This may be limited in nature, but may also be multifaceted and complex. When conflict occurs between states the problems of conflict resolution are relatively clear cut. In intra-state conflicts the grievance of the belligerent parties and the causes of the emergency may be extremely complex and difficult to identify. In both cases, PSO may involve a wide range of Government agencies, military and civilian authorities, regular and irregular armed forces and local, sub-regional and regional organisations in addition to the UN organisations as well as Non-Governmental Organisations (NG0s) and Private Voluntary Organisations (PV0s). They all have to cooperate closely in order to carry out a PSO effectively and successfully according to its mandate. While not exhaustive the following characteristics apply to PS0s:

a.   Political Primacy. As PS0s are authorised by a political mandate, the
overall authority will be political. In UN-led PS0s it may be a Special Representative to the UN Secretary General while in OSCE-lead PS0s a Head of Mission may be appointed. Should NATO be involved in a PSO the NAC will define the political parameters in which NATO forces will operate. In the conduct of PSO military commanders at all levels should be aware of the interaction between the political and operational and tactical levels.

b.   Objective. The objective of a PSO should be defined in the mandate as clearly as possible in order to be translated into implementing policy and instructions. It is important that implementing authorities translate the mandate into clear and achievable tasks which could form the basis for terms of reference for all parties involved in a PSO and for operational orders for NATO forces. Commanders should understand the strategic goals to allow appropriate objectives to be set and ensure that they contribute to the unity of effort.

C.   Composite Response. Complex emergencies require a response which coordinates the actions of military, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies involved. As the PSO is multi-dimensional in tasks and participation, cooperation between all participating elements and coordination of all efforts is essential for achieving the mandate. Such a composite response should be designed to control, contain and redress the immediate and underlying causes and symptoms of the problem such that the operation can progress towards a lasting settlement. Civil-military mechanisms should be established at all levels providing for a structure which will permit military and political authorities to express and implement their intentions.

d.   Coordinating Mechanisms. The Special Representative/Head of Mission should develop a plan to coordinate the actions of all involved agencies, including the military force to ensure unity of purpose and effort. This plan should, inter alia, specify those mechanisms required for detailed coordination, such as the establishment of communication networks and exchange of

liaison officers. Within this framework Alliance forces will cooperate with civil authorities in accordance with MC 411, NATO CIMIC Policy.

e.   Exit Criteria. For most PS0s, the determination of exit criteria may be difficult, but it is essential to have a clear mandate. The exit criteria will then be those conditions which, when achieved, will constitute the successful military contribution to the political process of achieving a lasting settlement. These conditions should be determined in advance. When the PSF is withdrawn the peace building process can be sustained militarily by "stand off deterrence".

PRINCIPLES FOR THE CONDUCT OF PSO

11. The Principles of PS0s. The principles for PS0s described below may not apply equally or in every situation, nevertheless all should be considered.

a.   Unity of Command. Unity of command over military forces is a nonnegotiable principle within NATO and is not to be compromised. However, even amongst the military contingents, national requirements may impact on normal command arrangements and the achievement of total cooperation. At transfer of authority of national military components, clear command arrangements must be agreed upon by the different nations. The relationship between the mandating authority and NATO will be determined by the NAC. In theatre, the Force Commander (FC) will be responsible for all military aspects of the mission in the area of operations. The FC will have in principle operational control over all military contingents. If unable to achieve unity of command over all elements in the theatre, then unity of effort, at the very least, must be agreed with the non-military organisations present.

b.   Unity of Effort. The complexity of any likely PSO that NATO could undertake, and the necessity for continual political-military interaction with a large number of International Organisations (IOs), NG0s, and will probably make coordination with their activities one of the most difficult challenges. Unity of effort recognises the need for a coherent approach to a common objective between the various military contingents and between the military and civilian components of any operation. It also acknowledges that coordination with civilian agencies can usually only be achieved by dialogue and consensus and not by command. To achieve unity of effort at the strategic level requires close liaison between the supra-national and national political bodies and, at the tactical level, close and early liaison between the military and civilian components of the operation. Effective liaison at all levels and regular conferences and meetings involving all agencies and parties will be essential to achieving unity of effort.

C.   Impartiality. PS0s must be conducted without favour or prejudice to any party,   and in accordance with the mandate; this is essential to retain their trust   and confidence. However, at some stage in a campaign a PSF may be accused of being partial and this may have a negative effect upon the credibility of the Force and its ability to accomplish its mission. Whenever possible such accusations should be refuted and all actions taken to demonstrate and convey the impartial status of the PSF. Effective communications and transparency of operations are key to maintaining the perception of impartiality.

d.   Consent of the Parties. The promotion of cooperation and consent, which are essential prerequisites for PSO under Chapter V] of the UN Charter, will be fundamental to achieving the objective in all PSO. Any force activities which may result in a loss of consent should therefore be balanced against this requirement. A general loss of consent by a PSF only resourced and configured for PK may have grave consequences. Any loss of consent for a PSF prepared for PE should be manageable but will eventually need to be recovered if the operation is to progress towards the desired end state.

e.   Credibility. For the PSF to be effective, it must be credible. The credibility of the operation is a reflection of the parties' assessment of the force's capability to accomplish the mission. Establishing credibility will also create confidence in the operation. While the PSF should not appear to pose a direct threat to any of the parties, there must be no doubt that the military is fully capable of carrying out its responsibilities and is supported by a political willingness to do so. Therefore the national military components must be well-equipped, and self-sufficient as well as prepared and trained for their mission. It must demonstrate this effectiveness with the initial deployment to the theatre. The PSF must be employed with a sound concept of operations and robust ROES, based upon the mandate, to guarantee the mission success, even in the face of attempts by the parties to either gain an advantage or to undermine the mission. The force must respond with professional bearing and swift, effective, impartial actions to incidents. All personnel must consistently demonstrate the highest standards of disciplined, controlled and professional behaviour, both on and off duty.

f.   Transparency of Operations. The PSF's mission and concept of operations must be easily understood and obvious to all parties. Failure to achieve a common understanding may lead to suspicion, mistrust or even hostility. Information should be gathered and communicated through open sources wherever possible. While transparency of operations should be the general rule, this must be balanced against the need to ensure the security of the mission and its members. However, the requirements of force protection, especially in the conduct of PE may render transparency inappropriate.

g.   Use of Force. The use of force is one of the most important factors with which a FC must deal. It affects every aspect of the mission and requires continual review to balance security and mission accomplishment. The FC should make the final determination regarding force capability requirements after reviewing the situation, mandate, terms of reference and ROE. In all cases, the use of force in any PSO shall be in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter, the mandate, and the rules of international law; only the minimum force necessary should be used.

(1)   In all PS0s the use of force is clearly permitted for self-defence; any further use of force such as to guarantee the freedom of movement other than in self-defence, must be authorised explicitly by the mandate. The precise amount of force to be used is a tactical decision by the local commander based on the threat situation and authorised ROEs that must balance the requirements of the mandate with potential strategic, operational and tactical consequences. When used, force should be precise, timely, appropriate and proportionate. However, any recourse to force should be aimed at resolving or defusing a situation, not escalating it. The

unnecessary, or irrational, use of force will adversely affect the perceived impartiality and credibility of the organisation, leading potentially to the loss of consent in a PSO and possible failure of the mission. Additionally, it may lead to an overall increase in the level of violence throughout the mission area. Alternatives to the use of force, e.g. negotiations, may be adequate, and must always be considered and used if appropriate. Detailed ROE will normally be drawn from MC 362[1]; however, ROE cannot cover every situation and cannot substitute for the sound judgement of those involved.

(2)   Force Configuration. An additional consideration in planning the deployment of specific weapons, such as armoured vehicles or heavy weapons, is the balance between the security of the force and the signal these actions send. A heavily armed PSF may be seen as a threat, thus undermining its credibility and perceived impartiality. Conversely, a lightly armed PSF that can not challenge breaches of the mandate when confronted also undermines its credibility, restricts flexibility and exposes itself to unnecessary risks that could jeopardise successful completion of the mission.

h.   Security. Self defence and force protection are command responsibilities in all military operations. In PSO the military force may also be given specific responsibilities for the protection of any civilian components of the operation. This will have to be taken into account when deciding the size and composition of the force and when drawing up military orders and ROE. On occasions aid agencies may employ local civilians as guards and escorts, in which case their security status must also be established and then regularly reviewed. All personnel involved in an operation should be trained and equipped in such a manner as to maximise their safety while carrying out their task.

i.   Flexibility. Within the constraints of the mandate and ROE, forces should be able to adapt and move from one activity to another at short notice and with the minimum of outside assistance. A PSF should be balanced and independent in terms of skills, capabilities, equipment and logistics. Arrangements to facilitate the speedy availability of reserves should also be considered. Thus, flexibility is vital to the successful conduct of PSO and in particular PE which has to be capable of dealing with an escalation of military activity. As a consequence ROE and the mechanism for their amendment have to be flexible, responsive and designed to cope with likely changes in the operational environment and the PSO force structure. ROE should be so designed, however, to provide the military commanders the maximum flexibility to perform their missions in a changing environment.

j. Mutual Respect. Through Status **Of** Forces Agreements (SOFA) or other special agreements the PSF enjoys certain immunities related to its duties. Notwithstanding this, members of the PSF must respect the laws and customs of the host nation and must be seen to be doing so. The PSF will also acknowledge the de-facto status and position of the parties to the conflict and will usually not act to change them, except as agreed by all parties.

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[1] MC 362, when approved, will replace MC 19212, MC 6611 and MC 193
and will cover ROE for Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations.

k.   Freedom of Movement. Freedom of movement is essential for the successful accomplishment of any PSO and should be covered by the mandate. The PSF should be free at all times to perform its duties throughout the designated mission area. Experience indicates that conflicting factors will often impose local restrictions on freedom of movement. These restrictions must be resolutely and swiftly resolved through negotiations, and if these do not achieve success, more vigorous and resolute action up to and including the use of force may be needed.

l.   Civil-Military Coordination and Liaison. The timely and effective coordination of the work of troop contributing nations and the agencies and organisations involved in a mission is essential for achieving its objectives. In order to ensure transparency and coherence, coordination arrangements should encompass all of the political, military, diplomatic, administrative and humanitarian organisations concerned, and take into account that some humanitarian organisations (including UNHCR, ICRC, UNICEF and WFP) have permanent mandates of their own. Whenever necessary, and if required by the nature of the mission, this coordination may include NG0s and PV0s. These coordinating arrangements should be supported by extensive liaison with all the agencies and organisations involved. Relations between the military component of an operation and non-military agencies should be based on mutual respect, communication and standardisation of support in order to ensure that one does not undermine the efforts of the other, that unnecessary overlap is avoided and that unity of effort is concentrated on the fulfillment of the mandate.

CONDITIONS FOR ALLIANCE INVOLVEMENT IN PS0s

12.   Before deciding to become involved in a specific PSO, the Alliance will carefully consider the objectives of the operation, what can be achieved by NATO participation, the probability of success, and the possible risks. Prior to approving Alliance support, the NAC will probably require the conditions outlined below to provide an acceptable framework for accomplishment of the PSO. However, it is understood that for PE missions several of these conditions may not exist.

a.   Political Control and Guidance. The overall political control of a PSO will be the responsibility of a single, internationally recognised, political organisation, i.e. the UN or OSCE. The senior executive body of the responsible organisation will appoint a Head of Mission and provide a clear written mandate specifying the mission and its objectives, authority, expected duration, and terms of reference. The Head of Mission should be a political representative of the authorising political body, and will act on behalf of that organisation in all matters related to the assigned mission. The responsible international organisation will request support for the conduct of the mission from a regional organisation and/or NATO.

b.   Clear and Precise Mandate. The NACC Athens Report states that "the basis for any mission is a clear and precise mandate of the UN or the OSCE, developed through consultations with contributing states and organisations and/or interested parties, covering all of the essential elements of the operation to be performed". Mandates for PS0s should be achievable and

realistic and linked to clear political goals and should define a clear end state.. It is particularly important in multifunctional PS0s that clear mission guidance aimed at achieving political objectives on the basis of the principle of the peaceful settlement of the dispute be translated to Commanders on the ground, who can find themselves working in extremely complicated local situations. The mandate in such cases should be carefully drafted so as to permit a range of measures in response to evolving conditions on the ground, while not leading to an escalation of the operation. Appropriate advance contingency planning, including appropriate military and civilian advice on operational feasibility and the required capabilities, would be a useful contribution to the initial drafting of mandates. When the operating environment changes substantially, mandates should be changed, new missions established or, alternatively, missions ended. As well as when the mandate is first drafted, troop contributing nations must also be consulted at times of:

(1) extending the mission duration or enlarging the mandate, or its revision;

    (2) a fundamental change of the situation in the mission area, which could affect the implementation of the mandate;

    (3)   consideration of partial or complete termination of the mission.

C.   <u>Consent or Request of the Host Nation</u>. PS0s under Chapter VI of the UN Charter are conducted with the consent of, or at the request of, the recognised government, where one exists. In the case of PE where there may not be consent for the PSF intervention or there is an expectation that consent may be withdrawn, the conditions for NATO involvement should be specified in the mandate. The legal status of a PSF is normally established by the negotiation of a SOFA which has the standing of a treaty. When there is no consent for a SOFA, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or an exchange of letters may be agreed. The mandate, SOFA or equivalent and ROE, as well as national and international laws, conventions and agreements will control the conduct of operations. It is also important to consider the role that neighbouring countries might play in providing facilities for the PSF to operate from, or transit over or through, their territory.

d.   <u>Voluntary Participation **by** Member Nations</u>.

(1)   <u>Participation</u>. Within NATO, all member nations must agree on Alliance support to a particular PSO, but some nations may choose not to participate. This should not preclude Alliance action in the PSO, as long as there is consensus on a NATO response. Nonetheless, if the Alliance provides a CJTF HQ for a PSO, personnel from a NATO CJTF HQ nucleus would, in principle, remain in their posts until they were replaced by suitably trained personnel, on rotation. However it will be up to individual nations as to whether they will remain in place.

(2)   <u>Force Contributions</u>. Troop contributing nations should be involved early in the planning, preparation and decision-making procedures in operations to which they contribute. The type of personnel (professional, conscripts, or reserve) and units (standing or reserve) to be deployed are decisions left exclusively to contributing nations. However, implicit within a

nation's offer to support a PSO is the understanding that resources will be made available promptly. Any political or military limitations to the contributions to the PSF should be stated early so planners may account for them. Political restrictions should be minimised to allow commanders maximum flexibility within the terms of the mandate. It is also essential that military contributions contain the required capabilities and meet the necessary standards of training and readiness for the tasks and organisational structure prescribed by the mission mandate. Once contributed, resources should not be withdrawn or re-allocated by nations without suitable notice being given to the NATO commander.

e.   Conditions for Terminating the Operation. The mission's mandate should be reviewed periodically by the responsible international organisation to determine if progress has been made, how the operation may be adjusted, or if the mission should be terminated. The NAC would advise the mandating authority of its collective view on the continuation of a PSO involving Alliance support. It may, however, be better to define objectives and establish criteria and conditions which allow the operation to be regularly reassessed as it progresses towards the end-state defined in the mandate. Time constraints for the duration of the operation are high level political-military decisions. On the one hand, the declaration of an operational timescale can cede the initiative to the parties to the conflict. They can then wait for the departure of the PSF. On the other hand, establishing a fixed date for the participation of the PSF serves notice that parties must also work diligently to resolve their differences, unless they are willing to forgo the support of the PSF. In either case, establishing criteria that require quantifiable actions by all parties and demonstrate successful implementation of the mandate to the international community are important. Additionally, the strategic commander should ask the NAC to maintain positive momentum in resolving political and economic issues. The failure to move forward on these issues will only prolong the force's mission.

f.   Legitimacy. Allied joint operations need to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government. PS0s will normally be conducted under UN/OSCE auspices, thereby giving the operation multinational or worldwide legitimacy. During operations in areas in which state institutions no longer exist or are not universally recognised, extreme caution will be required when dealing with individuals and organisations to avoid inadvertently legitimising them. Every opportunity should be taken to enhance both domestic and international perceptions of the legitimacy of an operation.

POLITICAL CONTROL AND DIRECTION

13.   General. The complex, multifunctional and political nature of PSO requires detailed political direction and control. -

14.   Mandate and Initiating Directive. Specific guidance should be provided by the authorising political body in consultation with the NAC by the development of a mandate. Based on this mandate the Head of Mission will develop a comprehensive mission plan. This mission plan should coordinate the activities of all mission components, both military and civilian, in

accordance with the mandate. Specific detailed guidance should be provided by the NAC by the issue of an initiating directive to the appropriate MNC to develop a comprehensive PSO plan. The guidance will evolve as the situation develops, and will address the following areas:

a.   Mandate, mission statement and desired end state.

b.   Clear political guidance, objectives and limitations including a civil implementation plan, as appropriate.

c.   Anticipated direction of the operation/activities in order to fulfill the mandate.

d.   Relationships with parties to the conflict and other political and military entities in the conflict area.

e.   Criteria for and character of mission accomplishment and the disengagement **of** NATO elements.

15.   Partner Involvement. With the understanding that the decision to mount a NATO-led PSO rests with the Alliance and that the NAC retains the ultimate authority to direct the operation, Partner nations should be involved in the process of developing political guidance for and oversight over such operations. To this end:

a.   Consultation with Partners should begin early in the appropriate existing fora, including the MC.

b.   Decisions to invite Partners to contribute to future NATO-led PSO will be taken by the NAC on the basis of NMAs' advice, taking into account both political considerations as well as the need for military effectiveness.

c.   Contributing Partners should be consulted early on the political framework for the operation and be associated with the planning process as early **as** possible.

d.   Allies and contributing Partners should meet as required in the EAPC in a limited format. Moreover, contributing Partners should be involved more closely with the work of subordinated committees.

RESPONSIBILITIES

16.   Political control is essential in PS0s, and demands close cooperation and coordination of the highest political and military bodies of the Alliance and between NATO and the WEU in case of operations led by the WEU using NATO assets and capabilities.

a.   The NAC will:

(1)   Take all relevant political decisions concerning a NATO PSO.

(2)   Provide clear political objectives consistent with international mandates from the UN or the OSCE.

(3) Provide precise guidance to the MC for planning specific PS0s based on the mandate given by the UN or OSCE.

(4) Grant authority to the MC in a timely manner to facilitate the implementation of the PSO.

(5) Liaise with non-NATO organisations/states requesting assistance in order to establish modalities for supporting the PSO.

    b.   The MC based on MNC advice will:

    (1) Advise the NAC on military implementation of the mandate. As a minimum this advice will include:

        (a)   Military objectives necessary to achieve.

        (b) Concept of operations including associated risks and adequate reserve forces .

        (c)   Recommended ROE and their rationale.

    (2)   Respond to NAC directives.

(3)   Develop military planning guidance.

(4)   When required, participate in liaison activities between the NAC and the UN/OSCE.

C. The **MNCs** will:

(1) Develop operational planning documents for the general and functional areas according to the guidance formulated in this document.

(2)   Identify the requirements for all aspects of resources, finance and expertise to implement a particular mandate.

(3) Develop a situation oriented concept of operations for specific PS0s when authorised.

(4)   Inform the MC as required or requested on the status of plans and actions relevant to PS0s.

(5)   Coordinate directly with the responsible organisation about the potential Alliance contribution and with the nations on forces to be made available for the operation.

(6)   Establish liaison with appropriate military, political-military and civil organisations **as** necessary, when authorised.

d.   The NMAs will be prepared to coordinate with planners from non-NATO states/organisations, should such coordination be directed. All principles related to non-NATO nations contained in this document will be put into operation on a case-by-case basis, after relevant political decisions taken by the NAC.

PLANNING FRAMEWORK

17.   The planning for the PSO will be guided by the policy set out in MC 13312 (Revised Military Decision) which describes operational planning for the full spectrum of operations, including PS0s. The planning for WEU-led operations will be conducted in accordance with the arrangements agreed between the respective organisations. The policy, principles and procedures for Alliance CJTF operations, as laid down in MC 389 and related documents, also apply. Military planners will need to take into account the following :

a.   The levels of NATO military support may range from giving advice and coordination, to providing service support, observers and forces. Any Alliance commitment to a PSO will be directed by detailed political guidance from the NAC or WEU, in accordance with the Jun 96 Berlin and Brussels principles. The Alliance must also be prepared to make its collective assets available for WEU-led operations on the basis of NAC consultations and decisions.

b.   Partner nations will be involved in the planning process as early as possible through the PfP Staff Elements (PSE) established at various NATO headquarters. PSE can be involved in CJTF in accordance with MC 389.

C.   PS0s are intended to give the opportunity for a political **process** to resolve the basis for dispute.

d.   In a single area of operation in support of the UN or OSCE, several elements of PS0s may be involved simultaneously, each based on specific resolutions of the UN Security Council/OSCE and political guidance of the NAC or WEU Council. The involvement of civilian organisations and structures should also be taken into account.

e.   In the event that the Security Council resolves to extend the mandate from PK to PE activities in the same area of operation, further decisions and guidance would be provided by the NAC to NATO forces committed to the area of operation.

PLANNING GUIDANCE

18.   General. PS0s may take many forms and will take place in a wide variety of scenarios. Such diversity requires a flexible planning process. This process should also be sufficiently robust to incorporate Partner nations and other non-NATO nations, NG0s on a case-by-case basis, and will take account of the ESDI. Commitments and planning should be based on current political guidelines using where appropriate a designated CJTF HQ as the operational headquarters for Alliance PS0s but without requiring nations to obligate forces as they do in Article 5 commitments. Normal planning as well as planning for WEU-led PS0s should be conducted with all due regard to the principles in this document and to the extra considerations discussed in the following paragraphs.

19.   Command and Control (C2). The political authority for a PSO will be provided by the UN or OSCE. It will provide the political linkage and direction to the NAC which will generally retain detailed political control of the PSO. However, the deployment by the authorising political authority of a Special Representative as the Head of Mission will require the creation of a C2 infrastructure which provides coherence and ensures political primacy without detracting from operational effectiveness. Details of the C2 structure and arrangements of NATO elements and their relationships with other political, military and humanitarian elements conducting PS0s will be based on advice from the MC and designed in conformance with the CJTF concept. NATO C2 methodology should also reflect and cater for the wide diversity of agencies involved in PSO and that they may have management methods very different from those within the Alliance.

20.   Communication and Information Systems (CIS). CIS planning will use extant Alliance policies and procedures with due consideration of personnel and capabilities requirements. Details of CIS support for PS0s will be determined on a case-by-case basis in close concert with the C2 arrangements. Planning should maximise the use of NATO organic CIS assets and in-place commercial capabilities. However, NATO forces may require additional CIS capabilities. These may be provided from one or a combination of the following sources: the NATO CIS Contingency Assets Pool (NCCAP), nations or international organisations on a loan or lease basis, commercial lease or emergency provision procedures of the NC3B and financial committees. CIS planning will require a detailed assessment of the CIS equipment, practices and requirements of the non-Alliance elements involved. Compatibility, interoperability and connectivity will be significant concerns. This assessment should not just cover the military and civilian components of the force but also the parties in conflict and legitimate local users of CIS, all who will be competing for use of commercial services and the electromagnetic spectrum. The total requirements will place an emphasis, in particular on the requirement for theatre frequency management. Also, consideration must be given in the early planning stages to requirements for CIS capabilities (clear and secure) between NATO and non-NATO entities (e.g. liaison officers, political bodies, civilian agencies and international organisations).

21.   Intelligence Operations.

    a.   Background. The parties to a conflict may be suspicious of all intelligence-related activities. They may even regard the gathering of intelligence itself as a hostile act. It is for this reason that in the past intelligence operations in PSO have been termed "military information operations". The use of such terminology was an attempt to accommodate both local sensitivities as well as those which might exist within a multinational and multi-agency force itself. However, there is now a general understanding that the intelligence function is an integral part in the conduct of any operation, be it military or civilian, and intelligence operations will influence the conduct of PS0s in much the same way as they drive other operations.

    b.   Requirement. The intelligence requirements of the commander of a PSO are likely to be broader and more politically complex than those of normal combat operations. When an area of crisis has been identified and warning has been given, a special intelligence focus will be required at an early stage to allow the continuing assessment of the crisis which will be essential in support of the decision-makers and planners. The intelligence organisation therefore must be task organised, flexible and may require considerable augmentation to include specialists in a wide variety of fields. As well as requiring detailed assessments of the geopolitical situation, including historical and cultural influences, the commander will also require continuously updated assessments of the attitudes, capabilities, intentions and likely reactions of all local forces or factions and their leaders, ethnic groupings and interested parties to the conflict, particularly those that are potentially hostile. Monitoring of neighbouring or other external political or supporting influences may also be required.

C.   Sources. Some of the data required will be available from open sources. All other sources of strategic and military intelligence, will likely be available including technical sources and assessments from national authorities, but subject to normal Alliance security procedures. At the tactical level, the primary source of intelligence will be Human Intelligence (HUMINT) in the form of reports and routine debriefings of observers, patrols and other elements of the force that are deployed and in contact with the local population and any UN or other international organisation that may be deployed to the area. Liaison teams will have a key role in meeting the commanders' intelligence requirements.

22.   Command and Control Warfare (C2W). C2W strategies are applicable across the spectrum of conflict and have an important role to play in PSO. Commanders should consider the employment of a C2W strategy in pursuit of their mission. The commander's C2W strategy should be linked to all political, civilian, media-related, civil affairs and NGO programmes associated with the PSO. Efficient coordination of the use of all available military capabilities to protect the PSO force's command and control (C2) in support of the mission will be a high concern. C2 protection is vital to overall force protection and should incorporate an operational security (OPSEC) policy that specifically considers vulnerabilities in force CIS as well as other OPSEC areas. A C2W analysis of the parties subject to the PSO is invaluable to assigning military intelligence priorities and the prioritised use of electronic warfare (EW) and

psychological operations (PSYOPS) resources to support the mission. Continual analysis of belligerent parties' media resources is important to ensure their objectivity and avoidance of use as a command and control means to incite supporters of any party against the PSF. To achieve the operational objective C2W planning for a PSO will likely emphasise the use of Peace Support Psychological Activities (PSPA) to protect the force and influence the parties, by fostering cooperation and joint achievement of the PSO goals. However the use of deception or physical destruction may be appropriate to deceive or destroy an adversary's C2 capability. Responsibilities for NATO C2W policy will be in accordance with MC 348.

23. <u>Electronic Warfare (EW)</u>. EW is essential to ensure NATO's ability to use the electromagnetic spectrum, and for immediate threat warning and force protection. Although its name suggests that it applies only to actual combat, electronic warfare has a crucial role to play across the spectrum of conflict, including all the activities that comprise PSO. Commanders at all levels must consider the employment of EW assets to support their overall objectives. All sides to a dispute may have sophisticated electronic systems capable of monitoring, threatening, or disrupting the activities of NATO forces. EW can provide early warning which may prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflict. It supports diplomatic activity by monitoring compliance with agreements or sanctions. EW is a deterrent, especially if a potential belligerent knows that NATO forces can quickly locate and neutralise threats. If hostilities do occur, EW can reduce the threat posed by certain weapon systems and provide commanders with alternatives to more lethal options. The employment of EW assets will be in accordance with MC 64.

24. <u>Operational Techniques</u>. The need to achieve settlement as the long-term objective of a PSO requires a twin track strategy employing a combination of coercive and inducement techniques as appropriate and based on the principles in this document. This places a particular significance on those techniques designed to enforce compliance, to redress the underlying causes of the crisis which prompted the PSO and the need to promote cooperation, consent and a desire for peace. Those techniques most appropriate to such an approach are described below.

a. <u>Management of PSO Information</u>. Successful management of information will **be** amongst the most potent instruments that the commander possesses and will require his personal direction. Collectively, PSO information includes both Public Information and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Public Information activities are designed to allow the commander to communicate his intent to an international audience, including contributing nations and those external to the theatre of operations. PSYOPS is a separate endeavour directed towards target audiences within the PSO area of operations. Security of PSO information is an important consideration for PSO, especially when one or more of the parties attack or affect Alliance information, information-based processes or communications and information systems (CIS).

b. Civil Affairs. There are several elements to civil affairs: civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), civil-military projects, and community relations. Civil affairs are concerned with the

harmonisation of civilian and military relations within a theatre of operations. This involves coordinating and maximising the use of resources designed to redress the deprivation and suffering of the populous. Reconstruction activities enhance the credibility of the PSO force and promote cooperation and consent for the operation. They also help to persuade the parties to the conflict that their best interests lie in peace. Civil/military considerations should play a significant role in a commanders' estimate and planning process, both to identify tasks and operational constraints. NATO's CIMIC policy is contained in MC 411.

C.   Peace Support Psychological Activities (PSPA). The successful conduct of PS0s, short of PE, depends on the cooperation of all parties. The perceptions of the parties in conflict and the civil population are critical to continued cooperation and success of the mission. The perceptions of these target audiences must be understood and taken into account during the planning and conduct of any PSO and are an essential element of force protection. Perceptions of impartiality and fairness cannot be assumed. Perceived favoritism can jeopardise the safety of the force as well as the overall mission. PSPA are conducted to ensure that perceptions are accurate and to promote positive attitudes, emotions, opinions and behaviour towards the force and mission. PSPA specifically address the problems of rumours, misinformation, and dis-information by providing information and messages directly to key communicators and local audiences without the filter of any local leadership or local media. PSPA can project a favourable image of an even-handed and capable NATO force as well as to broaden the impact of positive actions and activities of the force and other participants in the international community (e.g. OSCE, UNHCR). PSPA are conducted as part of an over-arching PSYOPS campaign and are closely coordinated with the activities of the Public Information, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), and all other aspects of the PSO. PSYOPS units may provide support and technical assistance to non-PSYOPS activities such as troop information or public information but will not be given the responsibility to address such audiences. PSPA conducted by MNCs and their subordinates will not target the international media, friendly nations or forces, or civilian audiences outside the area of operations. NATO's PSYOPS policy is contained in MC 402.

25.   ROE. ROE should reflect NATO's formal political directives. They also reflect the political guidance of the NAC and provide direction to all commanders and members of the PSO on the use of force. ROE policy and procedures for NATO forces are in MC 362 [2]. ROE will be produced on a case-by-case basis on the advice of the MC and other military authorities and are authorised by the NAC. ROE should be designed to make legal provision for the PSO to use the necessary degree of force to achieve its mission. Nations have the right to issue restrictions to Alliance ROE in order to comply with national law, however, they should seek to avoid different ROE within the same unit. Nations must inform the NAC if restrictions are used. The right of self defence is inherent in national and international law.

26.   Legal Aspects. Law becomes relevant in the context of NATO PS0s in 2 major areas: firstly, authorization and competence, and secondly operational capabilities. In the first area, the law provides a legal basis and assists the personnel with firm legal authority. In the second area,

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[2] MC 362, when approved, will replace MC 192/2, MC 66/1 and MC 193 and will cover ROE for Article **5** and non-Article **5** operations.

the law provides the personnel with international status and ground rules. It also furnishes principles of responsibility to guide the conduct of the PSF. Planners should ensure that adequate legal protection has been made through special agreements providing NATO personnel the privileges and immunities normally covered in SOFAS. The legal authority for an Alliance PSO will be based upon the UN Charter and a UN mandate. Certain articles of the UN Charter, as well as the 1946 Convention on Privileges and immunities, set up a particular regime governing the status of some UN personnel. The preferable way to determine the legal status of the personnel and equipment of a PSF engaged in a host nation is to describe that legal status in a SOFA or other appropriate similar agreement with the host nation.

27.   Budget and Finance. Funding for the support of NATO PS0s must be determined by the NAC. Normally funding of Alliance PS0s executed by a NATO or CJTF HQ will be in accordance with MC 389 or other related documents. Due to the dynamic nature of PS0s, eligibility will probably be approved on a case-by-case basis. In principle costs incurred by nations participating in PSO will "lie where they fall". NATO common funded costs will be borne by the Military Budget (MB) and the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP). Funding requirements for assets used jointly by NATO and non-NATO entities need to be established as quickly as possible.

28.   Logistic Support.

    a.   General. The architecture and the procedures of logistic support will be determined on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with the principles and policies of MC 31911 and supporting NATO logistic doctrine.

b.   Logistic Planning. Logistic concepts and structures will be tailored to the specific force and its mission. Logistic force requirements must be established in consultation with contributing nations. Cooperative arrangements and mutual assistance among nations should ease the individual burden. Efficient methods of implementing multinational logistics such as multinational integrated logistics, role specialisation, commonly funded resources and the lead nation principle, should be used where appropriate to save resources, avoid crowding of limited infrastructure facilities, and duplication of effort. To coordinate the NATO logistic effort, the deployment of a Multinational Joint Logistic Centre or a CJTF Support Command is to be considered. National and NATO logistic planning must be harmonised at the earliest stage of the planning process and must take standardisation aspects into consideration. The certification of non-NATO logistic units must be completed prior to the force preparation process.

C.   Responsibility. Troop contributing nations and NATO authorities have a collective responsibility for the logistic support of multinational PS0s. The operational commander establishes the logistic requirements and coordinates logistic planning. This will include, in close cooperation with nations, the selection and implementation of the methods of logistic support. The NATO commanders' logistic responsibilities will also apply to non-NATO nations' troop contingents. Appropriate logistic responsibilities should be granted to non-NATO commanders of multinational units. The FC's tasks could include operating points of entry and lines of communication, coordinating the use of real estate and theatre level engineering if so directed. Troop contributing nations bear ultimate responsibility for the logistic support to their

contingent. This may be discharged in various ways, including agreements with other nations or with NATO. Nations retain control over their own resources until they are released to the respective commander.

d.   Authority. The FC assumes control of commonly provided resources as directed. Specific authorities, responsibilities and funding rules for multinational integrated logistic units are to be established early during the planning process and well before transfer of authority.

e.   Sustainability. To cope with unexpected shortfalls in theatre, when **first** deployed, units should be self-sufficient, with supplies commensurate to the task. For force preparation the NATO operational commander will provide, in cooperation with nations, a sustainability statement well in advance.

f.   Medical. Military medical services are to provide medical care as close as possible to prevailing peacetime standards, given military exigencies. Medical support must include the prevention of disease and injury as a key factor of personnel sustainability. Nations are responsible for the medical support of their contingents. This principle must be tempered by the need for cooperation, coordination and economy.

g.   Detailed principles and policies for the functional areas of Medical Support, Movement and Transport and Host Nation Support are laid down in MC 326, MC 33611 and MC 334 respectively and should remain in the forefront as NATO operations are executed.

TRAINING AND EXERCISE

29.   NATO conducts courses on PS0s at the NATO School (SHAPE) to train NATO personnel and those of NATO nations. These courses are open to PfP nations and could also be opened to other troop contributing nations which conduct a PSO with NATO. Additionally, NATO and nations' personnel can be trained on PSO at NATO nations' and Partners' training centres. PSO exercises are part of the MNCs' Exercise Programmes and are used to develop and validate the required practical skills for such operations. PfP nations can participate in NATO's PSO exercises. NATO PSO exercises should be conducted at all levels. Crisis management exercises, high level seminars and workshops and command post exercises cover the Alliance crisis management and decision making process. Exercises for multinational headquarters which could be employed to command and control a PSF and for multinational formations should address all stages of a PSO to include planning, deployment, execution and redeployment. Nations educate and train their personnel and units in all relevant aspects of the various peace support missions and the pertinent tactical skills in preparation for their employment in a multinational PSF. NATO may play a coordinating role by developing standards for education and training.