

NORDCAPS
PSO
Tactical Manual
2007

Volume I

NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manual 2007

Volume I

4th Edition

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Volume I

4th Edition

This edition is based on NORDIC UN Tactical Manual (1992 and 1996), the NORDIC UN Stand-By Forces (1993) and NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manual (2001).

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Preface

“PEACEKEEPING IS NOT A JOB FOR SOLDIERS, BUT ONLY SOLDIERS CAN DO IT!”

Dag Hammarskjöld (United Nations Secretary General 1953-61)

An essential part of the earlier Nordic arrangement, NORDSAMFN, was the challenge to benefit from the experience and competence gained from peacekeeping operations in such a way that the Nordic Nations' preparedness for United Nations peacekeeping operations corresponded to the needs of the UN. Experiences were therefore collected, organized and distributed in publications such as the NORDIC UN Tactical Manual (1992, 1995), the NORDIC UN Stand-By Forces (1993) and NORDCAPS Peace Support Operations (PSO) Tactical Manual (2001).

NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manual 2007 is based on previous Nordic experiences gained from PSO's up to the present. The evolution of crises and related PSO's has been drastic since the third revised edition of the manual. Therefore a need to rewrite the manual was identified to fulfil present day demands of PSO's.

The intention of this manual is to provide the “tactical doers” with a “tool-box” from which they may pick practical tools for various situations. However, the manual cannot cover every situation, and will not supersede any national nor multinational Commander's orders or directives. Neither should it restrict leaders and commanders involved in PSO's from using their own innovations.

The aim of the NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manual 2007 is to:

- Improve and standardise basic tactics and techniques for PSO's.
- Make available the experience and lessons learned gained during various PSO's in which Nordic nations have contributed.
- Provide a handbook for tactical level staffs and personnel (e.g. brigade, battalion/battle group, company, platoon, section) involved in PSO's for training as well as operations.

The Manual is divided into two volumes:


Volume I covers general and background information on PSO's and is a tool appropriate for the use of officers in the position of Force commanders and their HQ's as well as tactical level commanders and staffs. Volume I gives useful background information for all interested personnel of PSO's including junior officers, NCO's and private soldiers who like to get familiar with the wholeness of PSO's.

Volume II covers guidelines on how general PSO tasks could be performed and thus is a practical tool mainly for junior officers, NCO's and private soldiers. Force commanders, their HQ's as well as lower level commanders and staffs should use this volume as basic information about PSO techniques needed in order to understand lower level actions and tasks in PSO's.

In the event of divergences between SOP for PSO's and this manual, Force COM's Directives, SOP and orders are always to be followed.

Chapter I: Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support

1. Background



Picture 1: NORDIC MILITARY COOPERATION – a longstanding tradition –.

At the sixth General Assembly of the UN in 1952, it was proposed that national stand-by forces should be formed and that parts of these forces could be called upon in the event of an international crisis. The cooperation at this time mainly dealt with the organisation, equipment, and dispatch of troops.

The SG in June 1959 approached the nations that were participating, or had participated in the UNEF I with a petition that these member states in their national military planning should allow for possible future UN requests for PK forces.

In the early sixties, the governments of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden agreed to a basic composition of Nordic Stand-by Forces at UN disposal. "Nordiska Samarbedsgruppe för Förenta Nationernas anliggander" (NORDSAMFN) was established. The formation of units was mainly based on appreciations made in the 1950's and to some extent on experience gained from UNEF I and ONUC.

In the spring of 1968, the relevant data on the Nordic UN Stand-by units at UN disposal was sent to the SG, at the request of the UN's "Special Committee on Peace Keeping Operations".

Lessons learnt in the 1970's in connection with the UNFICYP and UNEF II missions, as well as the employment of units from the Nordic UN Stand-by Forces, led to certain structural changes in the composition of the units within the framework of the Nordic countries national obligations as compared to the original organisation.

During the late 1980's and early 1990's, more complex and diversified operations were conducted. A need for a more flexible composition of stand-by forces had become apparent. The civilian component of the Forces has increased in volume and in assigned functions.

In December 1992, upon a UN request, the decision was made to send a joint Nordic Battalion to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Nordic Battalion was the first combined Nordic unit and the first UN unit with the task of conflict prevention before the outbreak of hostilities.

Nordic Countries started to contribute to PSO's, lead by other organisations than UN. In 1996 a Nordic-Polish Brigade was established in a NATO-lead UN-mandated PSO in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In 1997 the Nordic co-operation was transformed from UN PK to include all types of military PSO. The **NORDic Coordinated Arrangement for military Peace Support (NORDCAPS)** was established. The aim was to strengthen the already existing cooperation within NORDSAMFN regarding military PSO and expand it to include operations mandated or lead by other security organisations than the UN. NORDCAPS is an optional tool for enhanced coordination when there is a common political will between the Nordic nations to participate together in specific PSO. A common Nordic contribution may vary from two to all five nations pending the availability of forces at the actual time.

A visible sign of the enhanced Nordic PSO coordination was the establishment of NORDCAPS PLE in Stockholm in 2000. NORDCAPS as an arrangement obtained a more formal foundation in April 2002, when the Defence Ministers signed the first MOU for NORDCAPS. Iceland joined NORDCAPS by signing the MOU in September 2003. The Ministers of Defence and the Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs signed the latest revised MOU the 8th of November 2006.

That MOU transforms the NORDCAPS cooperation for future PSO challenges that require quick consultations before a potential operational engagement. It expanded the cooperation and coordination to include PSO training support engagements and other means of military support as a part of SSR. It emphasises support to democratisation processes of Armed Forces in third nations and regions.

One of the concrete results of NORDCAPS operational work was to develop the concept for a "Nordic Force up to a Brigade size", which was declared to have IOC 1st July 2003. The Brigade was on 60 days notice to move. The Nordic Nations could not dedicate personnel and assets for such a capacity not being a high readiness force likely to be committed. Consequently the Brigade was terminated 1st July 2006.

NORDCAPS has not only been used as an arrangement to coordinate real life operational PSO engagements, but also to cooperate on logistical and movement coordination. All the Nordic nations have been conducting common sustainment flights to the ISAF operation since spring 2002. This cooperation was initiated and furthermore maintained by NORDCAPS. The arrangement has also been used to support the planning of common Nordic participation in a restructured KFOR, possible operations in Africa and Lebanon as well as support to the Nordic EU BG.

2. NORDCAPS today




Picture 2: *Logo for Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support.*

2.1. Purpose of NORDCAPS

1. The overall purpose of NORDCAPS is to adapt and further develop Nordic cooperation within the area of military PSO, utilising the proven ability of Nordic military interaction and enhancing the Nordic profile in such operations, in order to achieve more beneficial efforts to support international peace and security.
2. NORDCAPS aims at strengthening and expanding the existing Nordic co-operation in the field of military PSO's, focusing on the foreseen requirements for political as well as military timely consultations and co-ordination.
3. The practical aim of the cooperation is to develop concepts and mechanisms to ensure NORDCAPS as a flexible and timely organ for consultations and coordination of the Participants involvement in PSO. Co-operation will include the conducting of courses and education, competence development and training, particularly in areas such as Security Sector Reform, regional capacity development, and other areas of military support.
4. Any possible Nordic force under the NORDCAPS cooperation will be subject to separate decision, case-by-case.

2.2. NORDCAPS Organisational structure



Picture 3: NORDCAPS organisational structure.

The Nordic Defence Ministers is the top level providing the overall political guidance for NORDCAPS coordination. The cooperation between the Participants will be based upon the principle of consensus.

NSG is the ministerial body for issuing guidelines and policies for the co-operation. NSG is made up of Participants’ representatives, on Director General or Deputy Permanent Secretary of State for Defence level.

NMCG is the main executive body for military policy guidance and coordination on military matters relating to NORDCAPS. NMCG will issue military advice to NSG. One SNR will represent each participant in NMCG.

PLE is a multinational element with a military staff and administrative support function to the NMCG. The PLE will undertake tasks such as further development of course activities, executing fact finding tours and collecting PSO experiences. The Participants will assign personnel to PLE.

NMCG may establish subordinate working groups for the detailed consideration of specific areas. On a certain purposes can be established a projects with a precise mandate and time aspect.

2.3. NORDCAPS Procedures




Picture 4: Initiating Procedures for NORDCAPS Engagement in PSO.

When units from more than one Nordic nation take part in a new PSO, NORDCAPS can, when necessary, act as the coordinating authority for the Nordic countries concerning the operational preparations, the coordination of movement and transportation, and general management of matters of a common nature. In this context, there will be close liaison in order to lay down the general basis for calculating claims for compensation and the procedure for presenting these claims to the DPKO in UN HQ. The costs of participating in other than UN operations are paid by each contributing nation.

The NORDCAPS cooperation includes conduct of courses, education, competence development, training, and exercises for Nordic personnel based on the needs of the Nordic countries. Seats for non-Nordic students are also available. NORDCAPS is supporting the development of PSO training through train the trainer programs in different areas. Multinational training, exercises, competence development, courses and other co-operative arrangements in order to improve interoperability between forces will be developed in support of operations on a case-by-case basis.

One very well known tool for training units and individuals is the "NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manual volume 1 and 2". It has been developed and revised by the Nordic countries as a NORDCAPS project based on Nordic PSO lessons learned.



Picture 5: Nordic UN-Courses: The Historical Platform for NORDCAPS Courses Cooperation.


In the future NORDCAPS will focus more on PSO Training Support and Military Support, including PSO competence development. Possible Nordic contribution to PSO operational engagements will be assessed on a case-by-case basis depending on each nation's other operational commitments.

Chapter II: Introduction to Peace Support

1. Actors in the field

1.1. Security organisations

PSO's are not conducted exclusively by the UN, but for the purposes of this manual it is assumed that they will be at least authorized by the UN. This section provides information about the UN, NATO, OSCE and EU as bodies that may undertake PSO's. This section also introduces some of the key partners, which members of the PSO's will encounter at the country level.



Picture 6: NORDIC Military Framework.

a. The United Nations

The UN Charter came into force in 24th of October 1945, when the majority of the 50 states participating in its founding conference approved it. Since 1945, October 24 is celebrated annually as UN Day. When the UN was established in San Francisco in 1945, the total number of member states was 51. Today the UN comprises more than 190 states.

The principle aims of the UN are to:

1. Maintain international peace and security,
2. Encourage friendly relations between nations,
3. Contribute to international co-operation in order to solve economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems and strengthen the respect for human rights, and

4. Act as the central authority in the co-ordination of the contribution of the member states towards achieving this aim.

When conducting PSO the UN Charter chapters VI, VII and VIII are the most relevant.

Chapter VI of the UN Charter provides for the pacific settlement of disputes by a variety of peaceful measures including diplomatic efforts, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter is designed to deal with threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression perpetrated by sovereign states. Through Chapter VII, the UNSC is empowered to investigate alleged violations and then determine measures to be taken against the states and parties concerned. These measures can include political and economic (e.g. sanctions) pressure (Article 41) and the use of force (Article 42).

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter authorizes regional arrangements and agencies to deal with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security to procure pacific settlements to local disputes within their regions, as long as their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. The Charter does not authorize regional organizations to use enforcement action to settle disputes without the prior authorisation of the UNSC.

UN PSO's authorized by the UNSC under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, may for the most contemporary operations include elements of Chapter VII in the mandate. In general this means that they have the authority to use force to protect UN staff, humanitarian aid workers and civilians in imminent threat of danger. Each mission is given a specific mandate that outlines its major activities and responsibilities. PK operations will primarily address issues related to stabilising the political and security situation in a country, but it can also assist with humanitarian and peace building tasks. UN PK operations are typically led by a SRSG and consist of a military force, military observers, a police component, several substantive civilian components, such as political affairs, civil affairs, human rights, public information, humanitarian liaison and a mission support (administration, personnel, finance and logistics) component.

Assistance to humanitarian action in the context of a UN PK operation may include the provision of transport for humanitarian organisations (for example in UN aircraft and trucks); gathering and providing information on humanitarian needs and sharing of information on security issues.

b. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The OSCE has a long tradition in civilian PK operations, with a total of 18 field missions in 17 states (situation December 2006), in Eastern Europe, in the Balkans, in the Caucasus and in Central-Asia. The composition, mandate and task of all these missions vary, depending on the overall situation and the need expressed by the host nation. In fact approximately 75% of the OSCE's budget and personnel are working on the field.

The present composition of the OSCE Secretariat is sufficient for the

planning, preparation, deployment and subsequent support of current field operations, including the capacity to cooperate with other organizations, including those involved in broader forms of PSO's. Specific efforts to enhance the organization's capability to plan, deploy and manage field operations have included the setting up of a small Operations Planning Unit (OPU) within the CPC, the adoption of the Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) to ensure a swift reaction to emerging crises.

Since 1992, under different names and strengths, a military body has been tasked to provide planning for a possible deployment of a multinational OSCE PK force in the area of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Today, the High Level Planning Group (HLPG) still operates with a limited number of personnel.

The rotating Chairmanship in Office (CiO) directs HLPG's in accordance with the mandate from 1995. According to this HLPG is mandated:

1. To make Recommendations to the CiO for a Multinational OSCE PK Force.
2. To make Recommendations on:
 - Size and Characteristics of the Force.
 - Command and Control.
 - Logistics.
 - Allocation of Units and Resources.
 - Rules of Engagement.
 - Arrangements with Contributing States.

An OSCE PK operation should be based on the provisions of Chapter III of the 1992 Helsinki Document, which establishes a general mandate for such an operation. Key elements of this Chapter are:

1. PK constitutes an important operational element of the overall capability of the OSCE for conflict prevention and crisis management intended to complement the political prices of dispute resolution. OSCE PK activities may be undertaken in cases of conflict within or among participating States to help maintain peace and stability in support of an ongoing effort at a political solution.
2. An OSCE PK operation, according to its mandate, will involve civilian and/or military personnel, may range from small-scale to large-scale, and may assume a variety of forms including observers and monitor missions and larger deployments of forces. PK activities could be used, amongst other things, to supervise and help maintain cease-fires, to monitor troop withdrawals, to support the maintenance of law and order, to provide humanitarian and medical aid and to assist refugees.
3. OSCE PK will be undertaken with due regard to the responsibilities of the UN in this field, and will at all times be carried out in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the UN. OSCE PK will take place in particular within the framework of chapter VIII of the Charter of the UN. The OSCE, in planning and carrying out PK operations, may draw upon the experience and expertise of the UN.

4. The OSCE may benefit from resources and possible experience and expertise of existing organisations such as the NATO and the EU, and could therefore request them to make their resources available in order to support it in carrying out PK activities. Other institutions and mechanisms, including the PK mechanism of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), may also be asked by the OSCE to support PK in the CSCE region.
5. OSCE PK will not entail enforcement action.
6. PK operations require the consent of the parties directly concerned.
7. Before the decision to dispatch a mission is taken, the following conditions must be fulfilled:
 - Establishment of an effective and durable cease-fire.
 - Agreement on the necessary MOU with the parties concerned.
 - Provision of guarantees for the safety at all times of all personnel involved.

In 2003 an effort was made to update the provisions for OSCE PK to better take changes into account that had occurred in international PK since 1992. The update did however not meet consensus, due to the objection of one OSCE participating State. It was seen that the provisions might be updated at short notice if there should be a need for an OSCE PK-operation. In the discussions in 2003 especially a "turn-key" -operation conducted by another international organization (building on point 4. above on the Helsinki-92 provisions) under an OSCE mandate was considered to be the most workable option.

c. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, DC, on 4th of April 1949. This created an alliance for collective defence as defined in article 51 of the UN Charter and led to the formation of NATO. In article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty the signatories agreed that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack against them all. NATO is not a supranational organization, but an alliance designed to permit international cooperation between independent sovereign states on a voluntary basis. Its decision is taken on the basis of a full consensus among member countries.

NATO's Military Committee oversees the military structure. This is the highest military authority in the alliance, under the political authority of the NAC, Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group. The MC provides military advice to the political authorities and gives guidance to the Major NATO COM's (SACEUR and SACT), who are responsible for the forces.

There are various ways in which NATO can contribute to a PSO. NATO can make a large commitment of forces and equipment, or it may selectively use its organizational capabilities and assets to provide less direct support, such as

Coordination of Support Employment of Selected Alliance Resources.

NATO support of a PSO will be authorised by the NAC. The question of involvement may be raised by member nations, or by the NATO SCSG, based on a request from the UN, OSCE or EAPC. If NAC approves NATO involvement, the approval should also include clear guidance to the NMA's on political objectives and any restrictions on contribution or actions. SACEUR or SACT will formulate a mission statement for the FC. The FC will thereafter make an initial plan. SACEUR or SACT will approve it and seek endorsement from the MC and the NAC before authorising the completion of a detailed plan. Once this is finalised it will follow the same approval process.

Once the military planners have an estimate of the approximate size and composition of the force needed for the operation, contributions from member nations will be sought. The PSF is conceived as a task organised, multinational organisation. The predominance of a single nationality is avoided. Ground, air, and maritime forces, as well as reserves, will be part of any PSO.

NATO participation in any PSO is considered virtually certain to involve working with contingents from non-NATO nations and organisations. Integration of such elements into NATO-led operations will require special consideration for the command and support relationship, as well as the specific tasks assigned to those to maximise their capabilities in the context of the overall mission.

The multinational contribution to PSO's makes the need for MOU's obvious. MOU's will allow for smooth integration of non-NATO nations and organizations.

d. The European Union

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is one of the corner stones of the Treaty of European Union (TEU). One important part of CFSP is the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which is defined in article 17.1. of TEU. A benchmark of paramount importance in the development of ESDP was the approval of the European Security Strategy (ESS).

ESDP gets its tasks from TEU and ESS, these tasks are:

- Humanitarian & rescue tasks.
- PK.
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
- Joint disarmament operations.
- Support for third countries in combating terrorism.
- Safety and Security Reform (SSR), which would be part of broader institution building.

In order to provide political control and strategic direction in a crisis, the European Council has permanent political and military structures within the Council of the EU. These structures are:

- Political and Security Committee (PSC), which main functions are keeping track of the international situation, and helping to define policies within the CFSP including the ESDP. It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction.

- European Union Military Committee (EUMC), which is the highest military body set up within the Council. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. In parallel with the EUMC, the PSC is advised by a Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM).
- European Union Military Staff (EUMS), which is to perform early warning, situation awareness and strategic planning within the framework of crisis management in ESDP. EUMS provides the staffs together with the military advices and crises management concepts to EUMC.

The EU has no permanent C2 structure, but it has five potential national HQs designated as an EU Operational Headquarters (OHQ) (Germany, France, UK, Greece and Italy) to conduct an autonomous EU led CMO. The EU has also an option to use NATO assets by Berlin+ agreement, which provides the facilities of SHAPE as an OHQ.

The EU has undertaken 15 missions and operations since the ESDP became operational in 2003. EU has taken over two operations from NATO; first in 2003, when Operation CONCORDIA succeeded from NATO's Operation Allied Harmony in the FYROM, and then in early December 2004, when the EU launched Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, replacing NATO's SFOR. For Operation ALTHEA, the EU continues to rely on NATO assets and capabilities, particularly for the chain of operational command as SHAPE as an OHQ.

For Operation EUFOR RD Congo the EU activated for the first time a designated EU OHQ Potsdam in Germany in April 2004 and deployed a French FHQ to Kinshasa DRC.

The EU is a global actor, ready to undertake its share of responsibility for global security. With the introduction of the BG Concept the EU has another military instrument at its disposal for early and rapid responses when necessary.

By 1 January 2007 the EU BG Concept has the Full Operational Capability. At that moment, the EU will be able to meet its ambition of having the capacity to undertake two concurrent single BG-size rapid response operations, including the ability to launch both such operations nearly simultaneously.

The BG is the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of either stand-alone operations, or the initial phase of larger operations. It is based on a combined arms Bn sized force and reinforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements. Depending on the mission, the BG could have a strength of about 1500 personnel. They should be sustainable for 30 days in initial operations and extendable to 120 days if re-supplied appropriately.

The ambition of the EU is to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of the CMC by the Council. On the deployment of forces, the ambition is that forces begin implementing their mission on the ground, no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation.

In order to meet the required five days readiness EU has agreed to establish a EU Ops Centre which is to reach Full Operative Capability 1 January 2007. EUMS Civ-Mil Cell forms the core of EU Ops Centre and it is going to be

reinforced from EUMS and from Member States. For the first time a civilian component is attached to military C2.

The BGs will be employable across the full range of tasks listed in (art.17.2) of the Treaty on the EU and those identified in the ESS, particularly tasks of combat forces in crisis management, bearing in mind their size.

1.2. PSO Actors Encountered at the country level

a. The United Nations Country Team

The UNCT is made up out of all the members of the UN family that are present in any given country. The UN RC heads the UNCT. In most cases the RC is also the HC and (s)he is therefore commonly referred to as the RC/HC, but in some cases, depending on the situation, the UN SRSG may appoint a separate HC. In a UN Integrated Missions one of the Deputy SRSGs is appointed as the RC/HC. This process provides institutional momentum for the integration of the humanitarian, development, human rights, peace and security dimensions of the PK mission.

Depending on the overall situation of a country, different UN agencies may be present, but you will find the following agencies in most countries: the UNICEF for programmes concerning mothers and children; the FAO for agricultural promotion programmes; the WHO for health promotion programmes; the UNFPA for issues concerning the reproductive health; and the UNDP for early recovery and longer term development programmes in various sectors.

When an emergency situation starts to develop, other UN agencies that are specialists in addressing humanitarian consequences will deploy. These include: the UNHCR, which takes care of population displacements; the WFP, which provides food distributions; and the UN OCHA.

b. The International Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

The International Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies is composed of three types of organisations (national red cross, IFRC and ICRC), which can all be found operating in the context of a complex emergency. However, all three types have different roles and tasks.

The national Red Cross or Red Crescent Society operates at a national level, both during conflict, and in peacetime. Typically, a national society organises volunteer movements, blood supplies for national hospitals, or training of medical staff. A national red cross/red crescent society may also intervene in case of a natural disaster at national level.

Secondly, all the national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are members of an international association, the IFRC. In the case of an emergency, the national society may appeal to the support of the federation if it cannot manage the tasks at a national level any more. This may be the case in a natural disaster, but also in a complex emergency. The IFRC then deploys a team of members from one or several national societies with qualified staff, and they intervene by assisting the weakened national society in dealing with

the emergency. A typical intervention of the IFRC includes strengthening affected medical structures, for example national hospitals.

Thirdly, there is the ICRC, which is the custodian of the Geneva Conventions, the International Humanitarian Law, or the law of armed conflict, and operates therefore typically, only in armed conflicts. In order to prevent violations of the rules of the International Humanitarian Law, ICRC also often disseminates the principles of this law. The presence of the ICRC is normally based on the agreement of the concerned country or the concerned countries, which are signatory states to the Geneva Conventions. The ICRC may already be present in a country when there is only tension and danger of an armed conflict, or when it has not yet erupted. It then stays on during the conflict and leaves only when all the consequences of the conflict that concern the ICRC's humanitarian mandate have mostly been solved.

The ICRC is strictly neutral and impartial. It is also fully independent from other humanitarian organisations, and can therefore often operate on both sides of a conflict if it has the opportunity to negotiate with all parties and be respected by all parties. The ICRC is the body that coordinates during armed conflict all activities of the national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. In some cases, the ICRC is well situated to negotiate access to isolated groups of people. However, it is important to understand that, in order not to compromise its neutrality and impartiality, and very often also as a measure of protection for the people under its mandate, the ICRC has to operate independently and may not share information.

c. Non-Governmental Organisations

NGO's are legally and operationally independent of governments, the UN and one another. They engage in a variety of humanitarian, human rights and development activities. Some are very specialised; others have a broad spectrum of intervention. Often NGO's work very closely with the local population. Despite their independence, NGO's must seek permission or legal authorisation and registration by a country before starting to operate there.

Some NGO's may work closely with the UN, or may even be contracted by the UN in order to carry out certain tasks (for example, food distributions, vaccination campaigns, reconstruction programmes).

NGO's depend entirely on public donations and/or donor support for their budgets. Most NGO's have limited funds available and spend little on administrative costs such as office space, staff accommodation, vehicles, and equipment. Credible NGO's are parties to the Red Cross and NGO code of conduct, which obliges them to respect key humanitarian principles, and will strive to adhere to the minimum standards for humanitarian assistance e.g. (how many calories of food should be distributed per day, how many litres of water etc.).

d. Local Authorities and Civil Society Structures


In a conflict, environment local structures such as schools, hospitals, magistrate courts, city councils, religious institutions, women's youth or farmer's associations have often ceased functioning normally. However, no

matter how severe a crisis is, there are always parts of these local structures still functioning. It is advisable to seek out and work with such local structures, but care should be taken not to favour any one faction. The local community is familiar with their own environment, climate, culture, languages, etc. and they have a long-term interest in rebuilding their country. They are thus best placed to advise, or when appropriate, to lead the international peace building effort.

2. Basics for Peace Support Operations

When conducting PSO, the PSF relies on activities that are consistent with the UN Charter and on principles and methods that have proven effective for similar operations. As a basic knowledge PSO soldiers have to use their own military training and skills within tactics and techniques. PSO activities include a wide span of different operations conducted side-by-side with other means of non-military measures. PSO may range from (but are not limited to) conflict prevention, supervising of observance of agreements by interposing, transition and humanitarian assistance to PE. Each of these kinds of operations requires the PSF to be impartial. It is important to note that various components of an operation should be mutually reinforcing and that a particular activity will normally be supported by one or more additional activities. This chapter will briefly outline the different types of missions, tactics, techniques and related military tasks.

2.1. Types of PSO



Picture 7: Peace Support Operations (PSO's).

a. Peacekeeping

A PK operation under chapter VI of the UN charter involves an impartial military force that acts with the consent of the parties. A cease-fire agreement is normally in place before deployment. The mission helps to keep peace so that the conflicting parties can pursue a negotiated settlement. Observation and interposing are the two most common types of a traditional PK operation.

(1) Observation

An observer or monitoring mission is the most basic PK operation, and its fundamental purpose is to observe, monitor and report. This operation may range in size from only a few personnel to several hundred, and is usually accomplished by unarmed international observers or monitors. Whilst military observers are likely to be employed as an integral part of any UN "blue beret" PSO, this is a less likely task for NATO PSF. It is unlikely that a NATO agreed mandate would accept forces under command operating without either weapons or appropriate ROE.

Military tasks:

1. Observing cease-fire and demarcation lines (as agreed by the parties).
2. Confirming the withdrawal of forces from the conflict area.
3. Monitoring conditions in a potential conflict area for signs of increased tension or preparation for conflict.
4. Working in conjunction with, or in support of NGO's, for such activities as monitoring human rights or electoral organisation and supervision.
5. Inspecting areas and facilities for compliance with terms agreed between the parties to the conflict

(2) Interposition Force

The objective of an interposition operation is to keep opposing military forces separated following a temporary cease-fire, or more formal cease-fire agreement. This requires the interposition of an impartial force between the parties in the immediate aftermath of hostilities.

Interposition involves placing PSF military units and/or military observers between warring parties to prevent the reoccurrence of fighting. Interposition often leads to the creation of an area of separation or ZOS where only PSF personnel are allowed to remain. The parties may agree to the establishment of an area of arms limitations on both sides of the ZOS, which contribute to stabilization for the situation while more durable peace-making efforts are initiated.

Military tasks:

1. Establish observation parties or posts.
2. Establish control and supervision over the main routes and key terrain to prevent either side from gaining an advantage.
3. Mark and continually inspect demarcation lines to lessen the chances of misunderstanding and violation.
4. Open routes for humanitarian aid.
5. Escort humanitarian aid convoys.

6. Establish Joint Military Commissions (may be named differently in different missions) with the legitimate authorities of the concerned parties to identify criteria for a return to normality, and to solve problems at the lowest possible level.
7. Monitor a cease-fire.
8. Establish ZOS and begin demilitarisation.

(3) Transition Assistance

Transition operations consist primarily of military tasks undertaken following an established cease-fire, but before the predominantly civil aspects of a long term Peace Building mission are in place. Ideally they are conducted as a Peace Agreement is negotiated and, thereafter, as an element of its implementation. The objective is to support the transition from conflict to peaceful conditions, with a political structure acceptable to the nation and the international community. The PSF supports this process by fostering an environment in which the population can begin returning to a normal life.

Military tasks:

1. Supervise the withdrawal, relocation, demobilization, and disarming of the military and Para-military forces of the parties.
2. Locate and confiscate weapons, munitions and supplies.
3. Supervise or assist in locating and identifying minefields, and in undertaking de-mining operations for own operational use.
4. Help provide or restore the civil administration throughout the mission area.
5. Provide a temporary law enforcement authority or support the civil police.
6. Supervise cease-fire or demarcation lines.
7. Coordinate and protect humanitarian aid efforts, including providing or restoring critical infrastructure.
8. Assist in the processing, relocation, movement and handling of refugees and displaced persons.

b. Peace Enforcement

PE is actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter using military means to restore peace in an area of conflict. This can include dealing with an inter-state conflict or with internal conflict to meet a humanitarian need, or where state institutions have collapsed. Conflict containment is the most expected character of PE, with peace restoration as a probable development of a PE operation.

The link between military and political objectives must be extremely close. ROE will be strictly controlled, with emphasis on the minimum necessary use of force commensurate with the achieving the objective and minimizing collateral damage. It is important to emphasize that the aim of the peace enforcement operation will not be the defeat or destruction of an enemy, but rather to compel or coerce any or all parties to comply with a particular course of action. The provision of adequate military forces and resources needed to

carry out the mandated tasks is fundamental to the decision to contribute assets to the PSF. Frequently PE operations are mandated to regional actors such as NATO or EU according to chapter VIII of the UN charter.

Military Tasks:

1. Enforcing sanctions.
2. Establishing and enforcing No-Fly-Zones.
3. Protection of Humanitarian Operations.
4. Establishing and protecting "safe areas" or exclusion zones.

c. Conflict prevention

Preventive deployment within the framework of Conflict prevention is the deployment of forces possessing sufficient deterrence capabilities to prevent an outbreak of hostilities. This can be in the form of: conducting exercises and over-flights, positioning maritime or "stand-off" amphibious forces, by deploying air or ground forces to the region adjacent to the problem area or deploying a force into the problem area itself. In the case of the last option, a clear mandate from the UN or OSCE and the consent of the host nation is essential for the execution of the mission. Once deployed, use of the military force would be similar to that of an interposition force involving tasks such as establishing and maintaining a presence, patrolling and routine training. It is important to maintain high visibility and credibility to deter, but not to threaten directly, potential aggressors.

Conflict prevention is normally a combination of early warning, preventive diplomacy, sanctions, embargoes and preventive deployment. Together, these may be regarded as confidence-building measures to maintain peace and security in an area. Identification of a conflict by early warning will allow more time for preventive diplomacy or military actions. Preventive deployment may take place when one or more countries decide that a United Nations presence along a border can discourage hostilities.

Military Tasks:

1. Preventive Deployment
2. Deterrence
3. Early Warning
4. Surveillance
5. Implementation of Embargoes in support of Sanctions.

d. Peacemaking

Peacemaking is accomplished primarily by diplomatic means, however, military support to Peacemaking is possible either indirectly, e.g. staff support or planning, or, in the form of the direct involvement of military assets. This may include Conflict Prevention missions such as surveillance, or Peace Enforcement missions such as enforcing sanctions. The planning and execution of these missions will be the same as for other elements of PSO. It is important that COM's and their planners stay abreast of the political and diplomatic initiatives and negotiations to anticipate potential tasks or changes.

e. Peace Building

Following a conflict, it is probable that the HN's infrastructure will be severely damaged and civil and political institutions will either not be in place, or will be unable to operate effectively. The situation may be exacerbated because one or more of the parties to the conflict oppose the final settlement, or because they objected to the role of the PSF. Peace Building actions are aimed at helping to cement a fragile peace and contributing towards long term stability. The military involvement will primarily be focused on the provision of a stable and secure environment. Other contributions by the military to Peace Building could be education and training of regional armed forces, for example courses in arms control.

Military tasks:

1. Supervise the withdrawal of forces from demarcation lines.
2. Ensure the withdrawal of heavy weapons to interim or final locations.
3. Monitor external borders.
4. Supervise the exchange of prisoners and movement of IDP's, DP's and refugees.
5. Assist in the DD&R-process.
6. Assist in the restoration of civilian infrastructure.
7. Assist in de-mining and EOD operations.
8. Support the establishment of a new political structure.
9. Support the establishment of a civil administration and law and order.
10. Supervise the relocation or demobilization of warring factions, regular, and irregular forces.

Military aid to civil authorities embraces all those military activities to provide temporary support to domestic civil authorities when permitted by law and are normally undertaken when unusual circumstances or an emergency overtaxes the capabilities of the civil authorities. Disaster relief operations are normally the responsibility of the affected nation.

Assistance to refugees and displaced persons is oriented towards providing vital services to those temporarily displaced from their homes. Military forces can assist these activities within their capabilities.

f. Humanitarian operations

Volatile political situation and manmade disasters have often created dreadful circumstances for the civilian population. Although these problems are primarily the concern of other UN agencies or IO's or NGO's it may require the involvement of a PSF, sometimes deployed under conditions of continuing warfare. The mandate is to try to stabilize a situation and assist in providing humanitarian assistance by protection of the delivery of humanitarian supply and refugee relief, while at the same time working with the concerned parties toward a negotiated settlement.

The scope of a disaster may exceed a nation's own capabilities; it may therefore request international assistance in the form of disaster relief. In such

cases the UN will respond via their special agencies as well as nations on a national basis. UN may get a lead role in coordinating the relief efforts.

The protection of human rights is a fundamental element of all Humanitarian Operations. The prevention and redress of widespread abuses to human rights will require a PE Operation.

g. Conflict containment

Conflict containment operations are designed to intervene in an area of actual conflict, or when conflict is imminent, and either to prevent any outbreak of hostilities or to enforce a cessation of hostilities. The aim of conflict containment is to prevent the spread of the conflict to neighbouring areas and states. Consequently, its actions should be designed to deter further hostile acts, to stabilise the situation and eventually to allow the situation to be resolved by negotiation and other more peaceful means. Conflict containment operations may require the forcible separation of belligerent parties. This may require the exercise of a considerable degree of force, and as such should only be used when other means of resolution have failed.

h. Peace restoration

Peace restoration itself will generally be the precursor to a peace support operation, and will frequently be the most appropriate response in the circumstances of chaos associated with a complex emergency, and when there are no coherent parties or the parties as they exist are so intermingled as to deny separation. In such circumstances, and provided the threat potential is low, widespread military operations of a police-type nature may be required to restore the peace. Just as in counter-insurgency operations, the successful conduct of peace restoration is dependent upon separating and protecting the general population, whilst gradually subverting or eliminating any who obstruct the restoration of peace.

i. Implementation of Comprehensive Settlements

When the parties to a conflict have agreed on a settlement, the UN may be asked to oversee its implementation. Such a task may involve a wide range of functions: monitoring a cease-fire; demobilisation of military units; assisting elections; rebuilding infrastructure; temporarily taking over some of the functions of a national government, monitoring national civil police and the repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees.

j. Restoration of State Sovereignty

The SC may authorise such an operation when all semblance of governmental authority has collapsed. The mission is to provide basic security, service and administration to the local population while striving to restore the capacity of the State so that it can perform its proper functions. In certain circumstances, the UN may be given authority to use armed force in carrying out its tasks.

2.2. Principles for the conduct PSO's

a. General

The challenge of PSO's is to achieve a well-defined objective as described in the mandate. This may be limited in nature, but may also be multifaceted and complex. When conflict occurs between states the problems of conflict resolution are relatively clear-cut. In intra-state conflicts the grievance of the belligerent parties and the causes of the emergency may be extremely complex and difficult to identify. In both cases, PSO may involve a wide range of Government agencies, military and civilian authorities, regular and irregular armed forces and local, sub-regional and regional organisations in addition to the UN organisations as well as NGO's and PVO's. They all have to cooperate closely in order to carry out a PSO effectively and successfully according to its mandate.

While not exhaustive the following characteristics apply to PSO's:

1. **Political Primacy.** As PSO's are authorized by a political mandate, the overall authority will be political. In UN-led PSO's it may be a SRSG while in OSCE-lead PSO's a HoM may be appointed. Should NATO be involved in a PSO the NAC will define the political parameters in which NATO forces will operate. In the conduct of PSO military COM's at all levels should be aware of the interaction between the political and operational and tactical levels.
2. **Objective.** The objective of a PSO should be defined in the mandate as clearly as possible in order to be translated into implementing policy and instructions. It is important that implementing authorities translate the mandate into clear and achievable tasks, which could form the basis for terms of reference for all parties involved in a PSO and for operational orders for NATO forces. COM's should understand the strategic goals to allow appropriate objectives to be set and ensure that they contribute to the unity of effort.
3. **Composite Response.** Complex emergencies require a response which coordinates the actions of military, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies involved. As the PSO is multi-dimensional in tasks and participation, co-operation between all participating elements and coordination of all efforts is essential for achieving the mandate. Such a composite response should be designed to control, contain and redress the immediate and underlying causes and symptoms of the problem such that the operation can progress towards a lasting settlement. Civil and military mechanisms should be established at all levels providing for a structure, which will permit military and political authorities to express and implement their intentions.
4. **Coordinating Mechanisms.** The SRSG, SR or HoM should develop a plan to coordinate the actions of all involved agencies, including the military

force to ensure unity of purpose and effort. This plan should specify those mechanisms required for detailed coordination, such as the establishment of communication networks and exchange of liaison officers. Within this framework Alliances forces will cooperate with civil authorities in accordance with NATO CIMIC doctrine.

5. **Exit Criteria.** For most PSO's, the determination of exit criteria may be difficult, but it is essential to have a clear mandate, which defines a desired end state. The exit criteria will then be that conditions which, when achieved, will constitute the successful military contribution to the political process of achieving a lasting settlement. These conditions should be determined in advance. When the PSF is withdrawn the peace building process can be sustained militarily by "stand off deterrence".

b. Principles for PSO

The principles for PSO's described below may not apply equally or in every situation, nevertheless all should be considered: (NATO Command and Control relationship definitions are used in this manual, see Annex A.)

1. **Unity of Command.** Unity of command over military forces is a non-negotiable principle within NATO and is not to be compromised. However, even amongst the military contingents, national requirements may impact on normal command arrangements and the achievement of total cooperation. At TOA of the national military components, clear command arrangements must be agreed upon by the different nations. The relationship between the mandating authority and NATO will be determined by the NAC. In theatre, the FC will be responsible for all military aspects of the mission in the area of operations. The FC will have in principle operational control over all military contingents. If unable to achieve unity of command over all elements in the theatre, then unity of effort, at the very least must be agreed with the non-military organisations present.

Unity of command in an UN mission can be different. All military personnel assigned to an UN Mission are under Operational Control of the Force COM. Operational Command rests with the national authorities. Military personnel might be assigned under Tactical Control of a Brigade / Sector COM – pending the size and structure of the mission.

Newly established UN Missions are implementing the ISS to harmonise and optimise the mission resources. The CAO is the head of the ISS and is responsible for the mission enabling units like engineering, transport, helicopters. Priority assignments and tasking of military enabling units is done by the ISS based on the ISS-concept.

During normal mission operations the FC does not exercise full operational control over these units. Normally UN organises a MCC that coordinates the mission priorities including the military activities for the tasking through the ISS. Depending on the security situation however the FC will resume full operation control over all military units to ensure the safety and security of all UN personnel.

2. **Unity of Effort.** The complexity of any likely PSO that NATO could undertake, and the necessity for continual political-military interaction with a large number of IO's, NGO's and PVO's will probably make co-ordination with their activities one of the most difficult challenges. Unity of effort recognises the need for a coherent approach to a common objective between the various military contingents and between the military and civilian components of any operation. It also acknowledges that co-ordination with civilian agencies can usually only be achieved by dialogue and consensus and not by command. To achieve unity of effort at the strategic level requires close liaison between the supra-national and national political bodies and, at the tactical level, close and early liaison between the military and civilian components of the operation. Effective liaison at all levels and regular conferences and meetings involving all agencies and parties will be essential to achieving unity of effort.
3. **Impartiality.** PSO's must be conducted without favour or prejudice to any party, and in accordance with the mandate; this is essential to retain their trust and confidence. However, at some stage in a campaign a PSF may be accused of being partial and this may have a negative effect upon the credibility of the Force and its ability to accomplish its mission. Whenever possible such accusations should be refuted and all actions taken to demonstrate and convey the impartial status of the PSF. Effective communications and transparency of operations are the key to maintaining the perception of impartiality.
4. **Consent of the Parties.** The promotion of cooperation and consent, which are essential pre-requisites for PSO under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, will be fundamental to achieving the objective in all PSO. Any force activities, which may result in a loss of consent, should therefore be balanced against this requirement. A general loss of consent by a PSF only resourced and configured for PK may have grave consequences. Any loss of consent for a PSF prepared for PE should be manageable but will eventually need to be recovered if the operation is to progress towards the desired end state.
5. **Credibility.** For the PSF to be effective, it must be credible. The credibility of the operation is a reflection of the parties' assessment of the force's capability to accomplish the mission. Establishing credibility will also create confidence in the operation. While the PSF should not appear to pose a direct threat to any of the parties, there must be no doubt that the military is fully capable of carrying out its responsibilities and is supported by a political willingness to do so. Therefore the national military components must be well equipped, and self-sufficient as well as prepared and trained for their mission. It must demonstrate this effectiveness with the initial deployment to the theatre. The PSF must be employed with a sound concept of operations and robust ROE's, based upon the mandate, to guarantee the mission success, even in the face of attempts by the parties to either gain an advantage or to undermine the mission. The force must respond with professional bearing and swift, effective, impartial actions to incidents.

All personnel must consistently demonstrate the highest standards of disciplined, controlled and professional behaviours, both on and off duty.

6. **Transparency of Operations.** The PSF's mission and concept of operations must be easily understood and obvious to all parties. Failure to achieve a common understanding may lead to suspicion, mistrust or even hostility. Information should be gathered and communicated through open sources wherever possible. While transparency of operations should be the general rule, this must be balanced against the need to ensure the security of the mission and its members. However, the requirements of force protection, especially in the conduct of PE may render transparency inappropriate.
7. **Use of Force.** The use of force is one of the most important factors with which a FC must deal. It affects every aspect of the mission and requires continual review to balance security and mission accomplishment. The FC should make the final determination regarding force capability requirements after reviewing the situation, mandate, terms of reference and ROE. In all cases, the use of force in any PSO shall be in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter, the mandate, and the rules of international law; only the minimum force necessary should be used.

In all PSO's the use of force is clearly permitted for self-defence; any further use of force such as to guarantee the freedom of movement other than in self-defence, must be authorised explicitly by the mandate. The precise amount of force to be used is a tactical decision by the local COM based on the threat situation and authorised ROE's that must balance the requirements of the mandate with potential strategic, operational and tactical consequences. When used, force should be precise, timely, appropriate and proportionate. However, any recourse to force should be aimed at resolving or defusing a situation, not escalating it. The unnecessary, or irrational, use of force will adversely affect the perceived impartiality and credibility of the organisation, leading potentially to the loss of consent in a PSO and possible failure of the mission. Additionally, it may lead to an overall increase in the level of violence throughout the mission area. Alternatives to the use of force, e.g. negotiations, may be adequate, and must always be considered and used if appropriate.

Force Configuration. An additional consideration in planning the deployment of specific weapons, such as armoured vehicles or heavy weapons is the balance between the security of the force and the signal these actions send. A heavily armed PSF may be seen as a threat, thus undermining its credibility and perceived impartiality. Conversely, a lightly armed PSF that cannot challenge breaches of the mandate when confronted also undermines its credibility, restricts flexibility and exposes itself to unnecessary risks that could jeopardise successful completion of the mission.

8. **Security.** Self-defence and force protection is command responsibilities in all-military operations. In PSO the military force may also be given specific responsibilities for the protection of any civilian components of the operation. This will have to be taken into account when deciding the size and composition of the force and when drawing

up military orders and ROE. On occasions aid agencies may employ local civilians as guards and escorts, in which case their security status must also be established and then regularly reviewed. All personnel involved in an operation should be trained and equipped in such a manner as to maximise their safety while carrying out their task.

9. **Flexibility.** Within the constraints of the mandate and ROE, forces should be able to adapt and move from one activity to another at short notice and with the minimum of outside assistance. A PSF should be balanced and independent in terms of skills, capabilities, equipment and logistics. Arrangements to facilitate the speedy availability of reserves should also be considered. Thus, flexibility is vital to the successful conduct of PSO and in particular PE, which has to be capable of dealing with an escalation of military activity. As a consequence ROE and the mechanism for their amendment have to be flexible, responsive and designed to cope with likely changes in the operational environment and the PSF structure. ROE should be so designed, however, to provide the military COM's the maximum flexibility to perform their missions in a changing environment.
10. **Mutual Respect.** Through SOFA or other special agreements the PSF enjoys certain immunities related to its duties. Notwithstanding this, members of the PSF must respect the laws and customs of the host nation and must be seen to be doing so. The PSF will also acknowledge the de-facto status and position of the parties to the conflict and will usually not act to change them, except as agreed by all parties.
11. **Freedom of Movement.** FoM is essential for the successful accomplishment of any PSO and should be covered by the mandate. The PSF should be free at all times to perform its duties throughout the designated mission area. Experience indicates that conflicting factors will often impose local restrictions on FoM. These restrictions must be resolutely and swiftly resolved through negotiations, and if these do not achieve success, more vigorous and resolute action up to and including the use of force may be needed.
12. **Civil-Military Coordination and Liaison.** The timely and effective co-ordination of the work of troops contributing nations and the agencies and organisations involved in a mission are essential for achieving its objectives. In order to ensure transparency and coherence, coordination arrangements should encompass all of the political, military, diplomatic, administrative and humanitarian organisations concerned, and take into account that some humanitarian organisations (including UNHCR, ICRC, UNICEF and WFP) have permanent mandates of their own. Whenever necessary, and if required by the nature of the mission, this coordination may include NGO's and PVO's. These coordinating arrangements should be supported by extensive liaison with all the agencies and organisations involved. Relations between the military component of an operation and non-military agencies should be based on mutual respect, communication and standardization of support in order to ensure that one does not undermine the efforts of the other, that unnecessary overlap is avoided

and that unity of effort is concentrated on the fulfilment of the mandate.

c. Tactics and techniques in PSO

When conducting a PSO it needs military tactics and techniques in order to fulfil given task and to meet aims of the PSO. Basic techniques are introduced in this manual, and those are used in the training of the PSO soldiers during their own military training or during training for a certain PSO.

Tactics regarding PSO have to be developed and integrated in operational plans according to given tasks, mandate (e.g. UN Charter chapter VI or VII mission), environment, threat etc. All these elements are to be assessed during the OPP. Frequently used tactics should follow the national tactics of the TCN. If the PSF is a multinational force, tactics in use have to be decided and trained by all TCN's of the PSF. In NATO and EU led missions this is accomplished by standardization of training. PfP participants in NATO led missions are usually bound to the standardizations through a MOU.

Annex:

A: NATO Command and Control relationship - Definitions.

3. Agreements

For a PSO to be accepted as legal by the International community it has to have an accepted status derived from an internationally accepted organisation. There are two international organisations that may give a legal status for military peace support measures; they are the UN and OSCE. A brief description of the guiding documents of an internationally legal PSO will be given in a hierarchical order below:

a. United Nations Security Council Resolution or Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe decision

For a PSO to have an internationally authorized legal status, it should be based on a UNSC resolution or an OSCE decision. Both UNSC resolutions and OSCE decisions are based on the UN charter. For PSO's the most important chapters of the UN charter are Chapter VI covering PK, Chapter VII covering peace enforcement and Chapter VIII covering the mandating out of PSO's to regional actors. The UNSC resolution will state the nature of intervention and might in case of a military intervention (Chapter VI or VII) call upon a regional organisation to take the military responsibility.

b. Mandate

The mandate will be derived from the UNSC resolution (or OSCE decision)

it is developed by the UNSC (OSCE). The aim of the mandate is to give broad strategic guidance. It will include conditions defining the desired end state of the mission and in case of a UN led operation it might recommend the strength of the force. It might also officially delegate the mission and mandate to a regional organisation. The mandate might also include other types of crises management such as economical and diplomatic means; that it might not mandate out together with the military peace support task. This way the mandate can imply close cooperation between the different lead actors in peace building. In some cases the mandate might be written in the form of a peace agreement, some examples of this would be the Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia or the Military Technical Agreement for Kosovo.

c. Status of Forces Agreement

The purpose of the SOFA is to establish legal rights and duties of the PSF and personnel in the host nation, and to define the relationship of the force and its members with the government and the citizens of the host nation.

A SOFA will normally include at least the following points:

- The international status of the PSF and its members.
- Entry and departure permits.
- The right to carry arms.
- Freedom of movement in the performance of PSO service.
- Freedom of movement of individual members of the PSF in the host country.
- Use of roads, waterways, port facilities and airfields.
- The right to operate its own communications system.
- Postal regulations.
- The flying of UN/NATO/EU and/or national flags.
- Uniform regulations.
- Permission to operate PSF vehicles without special registration.
- Jurisdiction regulations.
- Military Police regulations.
- Tax and duty regulations.
- General supply and maintenance matters (import of equipment, commodities, local procurement of provisions, petrol, oil and lubricants; in many operations an agreement between the TCN and the HN).
- Compensation regulations (HN property).

d. Rules of Engagement

ROE are directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or actions that might be considered as provocative, may or may not be applied. ROE provide the sole authority to the PSF to use force. The purpose of ROE is to give guidance to all levels of command (including individuals) on the controlled use of force, stating in effect the degree and manner of force that might be used, the weapons types and situations when force might be used and in which way it might be used. The aim of ROE is at the same time to provide

freedom of action and put constraints on the PSF.

ROE are based on the mandate from the UNSC and International law on armed conflict as well as experience from PSO's including the one they are designed for. ROE's may be changed by the appropriate level to suit the operation as well as possible. The only instance however allowed to change ROE's is the one that has developed them. In effect for UN mission the DPKO and for NATO missions the MC. After ROE are developed or changed they have to be approved by UNSC or NAC.

Some TCN to a PSO might have national caveats on some aspects of ROE. It is important that COM's at all levels are aware of such caveats as not to task troops with tasks they might not be authorized to conduct.

e. Memorandum of Understanding

A MOU is an agreement between nations or between a nation and an organisation. The MOU is an overarching document, which can be divided into several TA.

MOU's may cover any sort of issue but usually cover following issues:

- TOA.
- Command relations.
- Financial issues.
- Legal issues.
- National caveats.
- Functional agreements, such as logistics.

In some cases MOU are also written at the tactical level, this may be the case when multinational units are established.

4. International humanitarian law and human rights law applicable in Peace Support Operations

4.1. Introduction

The UN is not a state and as such cannot be a party to the conventions applicable to armed conflicts or human rights conventions. In UN operations each TCN therefore is in principle bound by treaties and conventions ratified and customary international law.

Applying this theoretical approach in a multinational PSO environment, could lead to some very difficult, and not very practicable, situations in endeavouring to achieve interoperability.

To remedy this challenge the UN SG has issued a bulletin on the 6th of August 1999 setting out fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable to UN Forces conducting operations under UN command and control. UN authorized, but coalition or alliance led forces

are not affected by the bulletin, but – naturally – remain bound by the international obligations of their troop contributing nation.

The field of application of the bulletin is further limited to situations in which UN forces is engaged in situations of armed conflict for as long as the conflict continues.

In the vast majority of PSO commanded and controlled by the UN, UN forces will not be party to a conflict. In post conflict stabilization operations or in other operations in which a peace has been achieved between former warring fractions, International human rights law applies.

4.2. Principles of international humanitarian law applicable in United Nations PSO

The following list is not exhaustive, but provides a useful overview of relevant principles and guidelines to observe in situation in which UN forces are engaged in situations of armed conflict:

- Distinguish between civilian objects and military targets and between civilians and combatants.
- Do not launch attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of life among the civilian population or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Make feasible precautions to avoid or minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian property.
- Never use force in reprisals against persons or property protected by international humanitarian law.
- Respect the rules prohibiting or restricting the use of certain weapons and methods of combat.
- Protect person's no longer taking part in military operations. Treat them humanely and respect their person, dignity and honour as well as religious and other convictions.
- Treat all detained persons with humanity and respect for their dignity and in accordance with the rules governing prisoners of war.
- Protect and care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked as well as medical and relief personnel. Only urgent medical reasons shall authorize priority in the order of treatment.
- Protect and respect at all times medical establishments, mobile medical units and medical personnel exclusively dedicated to medical purposes.
- Respect the protected emblems.

4.3. Principles of human rights law applicable in United Nations PSO

Fundamental human rights principles always apply. Certain human rights instruments such as the European Convention of Human Rights and the UN Covenants of 1966, including the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights law always apply – also in armed conflicts - unless states have expressly derogated from them.

Human rights law is very compatible with international humanitarian law in most fields. However, there are certain more or less fundamental differences, the most important of which flow from the so-called combatant privileges. In armed conflict the otherwise universal right to life is modified by the nature of conflict, thus combatants and civilians taking direct part in hostilities may be attacked directly and thus arbitrarily deprived of their lives.

In PSO in which there is no armed conflict it is international human rights standards that apply, including but not limited to;

- The UN Universal Declaration of human rights from 1948.
- Geneva Convention 1949.
- The UN Covenant of civil and political rights as well as the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights from 1966.
- European Convention of Human Rights of 1953.
- Geneva Convention additional protocols 1977.
- UN Convention on the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of 1984.

4.4. Non-exhaustive list of relevant United Nations conventions and other regulations

- UN general Assembly Resolution dated 9. October 1990 (A/45/594) UN model status of forces agreement.
- UN Sec Gen Bulletin dated 6th August 1999 on observance by UN forces of international humanitarian law.
- 1994 Convention on safety of UN and associated personnel.

4.5. Education and training of humanitarian and human rights law

It remains of utmost importance to uphold a high educational standard in the field of applicable international law in PSO. All soldiers must receive training in mission specific international law.

It is a command responsibility to ensure, that all individual soldiers have the relevant legal framework and must be communicated in a concise and accessible manner. Soldiers must be equipped with codes of conduct along with ROE soldiers' cards explaining the basic principles of applicable law.

5. Cultural awareness

5.1. General

One of the big challenges of deploying troops to a PSO is that they usually will be put into a foreign environment inhabited by people of a different culture. To be able to function in this surrounding the understanding and respecting of the local culture is of utmost importance.

The importance of cultural awareness has increased because of the expanded and very complex nature of today's PSO's. Present missions are multifunctional and multicultural and take place in different cultural contexts. The multifunctionality also increases the sphere of different cultures since different professional groups also incorporate profession specific culture.

Different cultures will not only be presented by the population of the operational area but also by the members of the PSF from other nationalities. To be able to function as a PSF all soldiers of the force need to be trained in cultural awareness. Only by making an effort to understand and to respect the different cultures the PSF will have a chance of succeeding.

The subject of cultural awareness should be included in the pre-mission training at all levels.

5.2. Culture

Culture is a system of beliefs and practices that is shared by members of a community or a group. Culture determines the values that motivate us, the way we act, our worldview and how we relate to other people. Culture is transmitted through contact among individuals and groups in society. One level of culture is obvious: the clothes we wear, the language we speak, the food we eat. There is also a level of culture that we cannot see: our shared beliefs and values. This usually becomes apparent when a member of a PSF interacts with people from different cultures in the mission area.

Examples of Cultural awareness factors:

- Religion and all respect of beliefs.
- The role of the family.
- Gender issues.
- Respect to elders.
- Child protection.
- Child soldiers.
- Language and body language.
- Local dress code.
- Traffic conditions.
- Human rights and humanitarian law.
- Communication and negotiation.

DO NOT GENERALISE PEOPLE!

A member of PSF should handle cultural differences positively and avoid conflicts due to misperception and interaction with host cultures. Cultural awareness is closely related to code of conduct for uniformed personnel. The main difference between the two is that a code of conduct has written rules to follow, while the "rules" in cultural matters are mostly unwritten!

6. Gender Perspective in Peace Support Operations

6.1. General

Violation of human rights might be one of several reasons for armed conflicts. Oppression and repressive control often starts off an escalating use of violence that can transform into an armed conflict. Ethnical discrimination and other types of crimes against human rights are the foremost causes to internal conflicts. In countries with scarce economical resources combined with only a chosen few profiting and lack of influence, these circumstances are often used as tools to fuel discontent and create violent ethnical and religious antagonism. Human rights and minority questions are therefore of utmost importance for the international community when discussing conflict preventive measures and PSO's.

One of the most fundamental human rights often overlooked is human rights for women and children. The situation for the civilians, particularly women and children, is adversely affected in armed conflicts regardless of their status. For the most part they are targeted by the combatants and/or used in different ways by them. It has become more obvious that one of the goals of today's armed conflicts is to expel and/or annihilate the political opposition. Ethnical cleansing has become a concept that makes the purpose of the acts of war clear.

With UNSCR 1325, UN has taken a firm stand regarding human and equal rights for women in armed conflicts. It calls the attention to the injustices done to women but foremost it acknowledges the active role women have as guarantors for survival of the civil society. It is the result of the Security Council for the first time analysing security politics from a gender perspective.

By acknowledging women both as victims and participants of a conflict and ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes, a positive climate for a sustainable peace and democracy will be created.

6.2. PSO's relation to gender in Society

Women make up more than 50 percent of the population and may support the IC with the core problems, and be the "doorway" in order to reach into the society. Several international studies show that local women confide in female personnel.

By incorporating gender perspectives in PSO's and expand the role and contribution of women in field-based operations the mission becomes more effective and are more successful than PSO's with few or no women participating.

A PK force must be educated and trained in gender issues before deploying in the theatre. Without training we are not able to get a mainstreaming of the gender issues on all levels in the units.

A PSO unit will work in an environment where gender perspective must be

taken into consideration. By recognising the local women and listen to their voice the PSO unit will get a more complete picture of the situation in the area, and thereby be able to support women or local women organisations. This is a report to partners in the theatre such as IO's, NGO's and UN agencies that have a special focus on human rights and specially women rights.

An increase of female personnel in all PK units will overcome possible cultural and social obstacles and thereby reach out to the whole society.

6.3. Gender within the Peace Support Force

Gender is an issue within the PSF itself. Present day PSF's in addition to being multinational will also incorporate members of both sexes. This in itself may present gender related problems within the PSF. To prevent this becoming a problem, a resolute gender policy based on UNSCR 1325 should be implemented within the PSO incorporating both gender issues within the PSF and the relation between the PSF and the local society.

Gender issues should be included in the training of all personnel to be deployed to PSO's. Officers should also take specific care to implement the gender policy within the PSF, both in its interaction with the local society and within itself.

The responsibility for respecting gender issues within units of the PSF always lies with the CO.

Every PSF soldier needs to be aware that he/she is responsible to follow the PSF gender policy and show respect to other members of the force and the local population regardless of sex.

7. Force Protection

In the NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manuals nearly all described actions are parts of the FP.

FP consists of all measures to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, in order to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force.

The success of PSO's depends on timely and carefully coordinated steps to be taken by all parties involved including the proper implementation of Force Protection. The conduct of PSO's requires all levels of military COM's and their service members to be fully aware of the diverse and numerous factors that can impact on these operations. PSO's can be highly demanding and add significant multinational and civil dimensions to military operations.

FP must be comprehensive to be effective and provide for the protection of personnel, facilities, equipment, operations and information according to the definition. COM's should include FP in the Operational Planning Process. Prioritising efforts against available assets and the assessed threat should be in balance in order to execute the operation. Properly executed FP could be a force multiplier.

Training is fundamental to building a thorough knowledge of plans and

procedures, which is essential to the protection of personnel and forces. FP is an integral part of any operation and underlines all aspects of training. Therefore FP must be addressed as a key part of day-to-day activities and operations.

Chapter III: Operational matters in Peace Support Operations

The operational principles of any PSO and the tactics used depend mainly on the mandate and the type of operation; in effect, if it is a PK operation under Chapter VI of the UN charter or if it is a PSO under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The type of operation (CFL deployment, ZOS deployment or other) will also influence the tactics used to perform the operation. Other factors influencing tactics are terrain, climate and the troop donating nation's national tactics and equipment.

To be able to plan and use operations efficiently all staff functions of the PSF HQ and subordinate HQ's must bring together relevant matters when planning and conducting operations.

The staff functions, usually found in a PSF HQ, are presented in the following subparagraphs.

1. Personnel

1.1. General

The personnel branch is responsible for all personnel matters on behalf of the CO. It is also acting as the link to the TCN's concerning all personnel matters. The main functions covered by the branch are:

- Unit strength maintenance.
- Personnel service support.
- Discipline, law and order.
- Local employees (in co-operation with intelligence).
- Headquarters management.
- Clerical services.
- Personnel welfare.

All details on routine reports and orders are stipulated in mission specific SOP's.

Frequently Media relations are attached to the personnel branch of HQ's where it has not been awarded an own branch.

1.2. Personnel Services

Personnel services handle unit strength maintenance and following issues in PSO HQ's:

- Leave and R&R matters.
- Casualty reporting.
- ID cards and driving permits.

- Medals and awards.
- Routine orders.
- Travel arrangements.
- Protocol matters.

1.3. Discipline, Law and order

The function of discipline and upholding of law and order within the PSF is mandated to the Provost by the CO. The Provost functions as the principal staff officer on MP duties and usually acts as the MP-unit COM.

Some of the main tasks are to be responsible for:

- General- and road safety.
- Security including VIP security.
- Investigation of accidents and incidents (if tasked).
- Criminal matters.
- Liaison with international and local police.

1.4. Clerical services

In PSO units clerical services will be seen as ecumenical. The clergy holding the post of chaplain is to serve PSF members of all religions.

The main tasks of the clerical services are:

- Spiritual care of the wounded.
- Pastoral care of the next of kin of deceased.
- Liaison with COM's and welfare agencies in ministering to the needs of the injured.
- Pastoral care of the COM's and men availability for counselling.
- Availability for counselling.
- Provision of regular opportunities for worship and ecumenical matters.

1.5. Welfare of the personnel

The COM and the chaplain are responsible for handling welfare matters. In some cases staff officers may be appointed as welfare officer. A welfare officer should be experienced in arranging all sorts of activities.

Welfare of the troops is imperative to take care of the mental well being and moral of the troops.

1.6. Mental wellbeing and moral

Personnel serving in PSO's are under more pressure than they would be under while they are serving in their home nations.

Some of the causes that could affect their mental wellbeing and moral in an adverse way are listed below:

- Situation related stress.

- Boredom.
- Circulation of rumours.
- Problems with personal relations.
- Home front related problems.
- Problems with adjustment.
- Anxieties due to unfulfilled expectations.

To ensure the mental wellbeing and moral of the troops all possible steps to counter negative effects of the mentioned and similar causes should be taken.

1.7. Media relations

The importance of media relations in PSO is rising constantly. Present day media distribution is real time, this demands proactive media relations. In PSF's there will be designated PIO's and spokespersons responsible for handling the media. Due to media moving freely in crises areas there is a need for media training for all members of the PSF.

In the PSF SOP, restrictions on what PSF personnel may say to the media must be stated clearly.

The responsibility for releasing information about possible casualties or accidents will be shared by the PSF authorities and possible national contingent representatives as stipulated by MOU's.

The purpose of the PSF's media relations is to sustain confidence in itself among the TCN's and to contribute to good relations with the belligerent parties.

A PSF's media relation's activities must illustrate the importance of its functions in the light of international peace and security.

COM's at all levels are responsible for all releases to the media, also of the possible impact they have in the mission area and in TCN's.

Some of the functions of the contingent PIO are:

- Co-operation with mission PIO.
- Reporting of news to home country.
- Responsibility for media releases to representatives of national media during visits according to PSF media regulations.
- Information within the contingent (daily – weekly news).

As a rule, when a member of the PSF is wounded, injured or killed, no information should be given to the public until relatives in the home country have been informed about the incident.

2. Intelligence, Military Information and Operational Security

2.1. Intelligence and Military Information

a. General principles

Intelligence is fundamental to the planning and execution of operations and to force protection in PSO and exists at all levels of command. The objective of intelligence is to support COM's and their staffs in their decision-making process by providing them with a timely and accurate understanding of opposing parties and operational environment. Within the framework of the Bn, an intelligence organisation will be responsible for the direction, collection, processing and dissemination of intelligence in order to provide the Bn COM with a timely and accurate decision-basis regarding e.g. activities, capabilities and intentions of the opposing parties.

Within an UN-lead mission, the term "military information" may be used instead of "intelligence" although the majority of information work follows the principle of intelligence work in the national defence forces. Using the term "military information" is an attempt to reduce sensitiveness due to the reason that opposing parties will most likely be suspicious of all intelligence-related activities. A PSF must therefore be able to balance impartiality and complete transparency of operations against e.g. force protection requirements on a case by case basis.

Regulations governing collection of information are stated in the mission specific SOP. These regulations cover the intelligence areas of interest allocated to the various units in the Force.

The intelligence and information reporting system is described in the mission specific SOP. Normally, it is also necessary to establish a particular reporting procedure at Bn level.

b. Requirement

Information about the opposing parties is of great importance to the PSF.

Such information should include:

- Deployment and adjustments in deployment of the parties.
- Personnel strength, organisation and equipment of the parties.
- Defence positions and preparations of new positions.
- Minefields.
- Rotations.
- Supply traffic.
- Communication systems, terrain, climate etc.
- Will to fight / "Esprit de Corps" .
- Characteristics of commanding officers/liaison officers. Attitude towards the PSF and to the local population.

To assess the political situation in the area, it is essential to have information about:

- Political parties.
- Political manifestations.
- Decisions dictated by local authorities.
- Economic and humanitarian problems in the area.
- Religious matters, including a summary of important events (holidays, dates of religious meetings etc).
- The attitude of the local population towards the PSF and the opposing parties.
- Characteristics of local leaders/important persons.

Changes in the above-mentioned areas indicate that something is happening or will happen. Some examples:

- Movement of local populations.
- Changes in the behaviour of the local population. A village whose inhabitants become unusually quiet or remain indoors may be a warning of trouble in that area.
- Suddenly imposed restrictions on the PSF or the local population.

A PSF must be aware that many rumours will be spread. These rumours must be treated with caution, as an accusation of one of the opposing parties or a person, based on unsubstantiated evidence, is likely to cause offence, distrust and trouble. The disproving of rumours is very important in order to eliminate unfounded fears and thus create confidence in the PSF.

c. Sources

The collection of information should as far as possible be carried out openly (overtly) and with proper tact and understanding so as not to be condemned as espionage, thereby jeopardising the status of the PSF.

The sources will include:

- OP's/CP's.
- Patrols. Patrols are often carried out not only to gather information, but also to show the PSF presence, thereby encouraging an atmosphere of security and confidence. Personnel on leave will also very often acquire information of value.
- Contacts and conversations with various persons.
- Official reports from host government and other sources (UN agencies).
- News media.
- Personnel travelling in the area.
- Military and other observers.
- International police.

d. Reporting

The creation of a secure reporting system is of great importance in order to prevent the opposing parties from gaining access to protected and sensitive

information. It is also very important that personnel and units within the PSF are accurately briefed about the information system in order to prevent loss or unauthorised disclosure of information. These measures will contribute to the overall operational security.

2.2. Operational security

a. General principles

The overall objective of operational security is that the PSF credibility and impartiality must never be compromised and that is a vital part of the force protection.

Dealing with operational security might involve protection against the following activities:

- Intelligence (information).
- Infiltration (in units or by local population).
- Sabotage (damage to material/robbery).
- Terrorism (bomb threats/hijacking).
- Subversion (misinformation and rumours).
- Hijacking of vehicles/abduction of personnel.

The operational security organisation could be:

- At Bn level: The COM, DCOM, Operational Officer or Intelligence officer/ Military Information Officer as a head of security matters.
- At Coy level: Usually the CO or DCO acts as Security Officer.
- At Plt level: The Plt COM acts as Security Officer.

The operational security tasks could be:

- To prevent unauthorised persons from obtaining any information about PSF operations, plans and other sensitive information.
- To prevent unauthorised personnel from obtaining any knowledge of information gathered by the PSF concerning the parties involved, their situation, intentions and plans.
- To protect PSF personnel from security threats.
- To protect PSF constructions, stores, weapons, ammunition, communications and other equipment from sabotage, robbery, damage and arson.

b. Advice to PSO personnel

- Take no part in illegal business activity (e.g. black market money exchange).
- Do not criticise the host country, the parties involved or your home country.
- Keep strictly neutral. Do not perform any services for the parties (e.g. sending letters, bringing parcels).
- Take into consideration the physical risks (mine awareness, IED's, booby-traps, suicide bombers, etc).
- Always wear body armour.

- Secure your rooms and offices. Documents and other papers must be locked up safely, maps covered etc., ensuring that no unauthorised persons have access to them.
- Consider all communication by radio, radio link and wire to be monitored.
- Be aware of the loyalty of the local population towards their own country or party/parties involved in the conflict.
- Weapons and ammunition should always be guarded.
- Never pick up any unknown object or material.
- Be on your guard towards efforts at misinformation.
- Be careful with use of alcohol.
- Never get involved in sexual affairs.
- Do not accept gifts.
- Avoid dressing, behaviour, etc. which may be considered contemptuous.
- During physical training, you should be aware of the risks involved if training outside camps/positions if it is allowed.
- Do not put yourself in a situation, which may give rise to future coercion.


NEVER FORGET OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND SAFETY REGULATIONS!

3. Execution of Operations

3.1. Planning

As functions planning, orders, deployment, operations and support in PSO are the same as in war fighting. However, the environment in a PSO is complex and makes it distinct. In PSO's the COM and staff must work in a multinational environment also including non-military agencies.

The PSO staff should develop a firm grasp on the military, political, economic, social, informational, and historical aspects of the region as they affect execution of the mission at all military levels. Working on political issues associated with the local communities in the AO will likely become a major



Picture 8: Operational Planning Process.

focus of attention for the staff. The PSO staff should develop the concept of operations as early as possible. The development of meeting and coordination routines within the military organisation and with other agencies should be established as early as possible. Similar mechanisms may be used to work with the local population leaders and government.

In all types of operations a military OPP will be used, as an example the following picture will give a very basic description of the OPP according to the guidelines for operational planning.

HQ staff duties should follow normal military routines. They are divided into:

- Planning of operations.
- Following up and execution of operations.

These duties result in various plans and orders. The format of these plans and orders will normally be described in the Force SOP and will follow basic military standards.

Plans and orders may include all aspects of an operation/action or only fragments of it (e.g. operational aspects, logistics aspects). On Force HQ level, plans will very often be broken down and described in various annexes, e.g. operations, intelligence, logistics, CIS, CIMIC and administrative support. At Force HQ level, orders will normally be issued in written form in accordance with a format stated in the Force SOP.

3.2. Deployment

a. Preparatory Work

During the preparatory phase while a PSF is being mounted, the force and contingent COM's and their staffs must master the details of the mandate, any relevant understandings and the status of forces agreement, as soon as the latter is signed. Ideally, the force will be deployed with the agreement of both parties but should one of the parties dissents, it must be prepared to deploy on one side only, behind the host state's CFL.

b. Area of Operation

Based on the SOFA, appropriate detailed regulations can be drawn up to cover the special needs. This supplement may include regulations for operational activities and the exact boundaries of the AO. It may also include regulations for the deployment (Area of Deployment) and the definition of the AOI. In conflicts involving opposing countries, the boundaries of the AO are normally stated in a Disengagement Agreement or an Armistice Agreement between the opposing parties or in the Secretary General's Report. In accordance with the development of the situation, preliminary directives and instructions will be issued during the initial stages of the operation as a SOP. The deployment will of course depend on the task and the area of operation.

The following factors must be evaluated:

- Topographical conditions.
- Sociological aspects (religious, ethnic).
- The civil administration within the area (districts, town and rural authorities).
- Local "military" units within the area.
- Communications.
- Administrative resources (billeting, maintenance, hospitals).
- Reaction of the local population vis-à-vis the force.

It is necessary to evaluate the various units as to their capabilities (PSO experience, training, equipment, sociological factors, language etc). In the initial phases of an operation, it may be necessary to deploy the units on the basis of the arrival dates for the units compared with an evaluation of the most urgent operational problems. All these factors must be evaluated with regard to the composition/strength of the force in order to obtain the best possibilities for accomplishing the task. It must be stressed that one of the main tools in accomplishing the task is that the units are well aware of their AOR.

c. Bases

There are two broad alternatives to base troops; outside the locality in which they are to operate, or within their AO.

Bases outside the AO.

Advantages. A secure base can be set up where off duty personnel can relax and rest and possibly enjoy some recreational facilities. The protection of such a base can be assured with less sentries and probably less defences. It is reasonably accessible to administrative transport, thus re-supply and the repair and maintenance of equipment and transport could well be carried out on the spot.

Disadvantages. Reaction time is much greater and reserves may therefore have to be kept at short notice and possibly deployed in anticipation of their being needed. Because troops may be unable to return to base between patrols etc. there could be a demand for sending some administrative transport forward into the operational area which requires an escort and possibly provides a target. The journey time to and from the base eats into the period available for rest and personal administration.

Bases within the AO.

Advantages. Reaction can be speedy and reserves can be readily deployed in response to rather than in anticipation of events, thus reducing the need to hold a large reserve at relatively short notice. Troops become more closely identified with the area in which they live which improves their chances of getting to know the local population, the detailed geography and

the habits of adversary groups. The ability to dominate the area is probably made easier.

Disadvantages. Troops can rest but not relax, they are constantly exposed to the danger of attack and as more personnel is needed for local protection their hours on duty will be longer. All administrative traffic should be escorted and this also puts a strain on manpower.

3.3. Operational Tasks

a. General


The normal task for any PSF will be to establish a safe and secure environment in any given AO, where the civil administration can function without the backing of enlarged security forces, and where the civil community can move and live freely without fear. Tasks are normally complementary and require a careful assessment of priorities and allocation of resources, but their combined purpose is:

- To achieve and maintain the neutralisation of hostile forces.
- To protect the population by denying FoM for hostile forces anywhere in the AO.

b. Surveillance and Supervision

A PSF must monitor the following:

- Cease-fire and armistice agreements.
- The establishment and supervision of ZOSs.
- The supervision of armament control agreements, when this is not the responsibility of an observer group.
- Military deployment limitations.
- Military withdrawals, disengagements and the return of territory.



Picture 9: Example of a ZOS monitoring deployment.

- Border infiltration and arms smuggling.
- POW exchanges.
- FoM agreements for non combatants working in restricted zones.
- Refugee camps.
- Elections.

c. Observation and monitoring

In PSO observation and monitoring will rely heavily on the human factor, i.e. observers on the ground. Observer teams or deployed units deter breaches of cease-fires and peace agreements. Their reports provide useful evidence to counter claims put forward by parties' interests at SC decisions. Observers or units may be deployed to observe, monitor, verify, and report and, where possible, to use confidence building measures to defuse situations of potential conflict.

d. Separating Hostile Forces

As in a preventive deployment, an interposition force should have sufficient combat power available to match whatever might be offered. The geographical separation may be delineated in any environment by one, or a combination, of the following:

- **Ceasefire line.** The lines mark the forward limit of the positions occupied by the troops of the opposing sides at the suspension of hostilities. They are often contentious and the subject of complaint whenever one side is left in possession of an important tactical or political feature. Moreover, the former combatants may not only dispute each other's CFLs; they may not even accept the PSF interpretation of the cease-fire agreement as to where their own CFL runs. It is essential for any PSF to have detailed knowledge of all the lines claimed by any warring faction. For a PSF to disclose one party's dispositions to the other would be considered a gross breach of confidence.
- **Armistice Demarcation Line.** The agreement of cease-fire lines may pave the way for the establishment of a buffer zone and the withdrawal of an invading force. At some stage the parties may agree to an armistice demarcation line, perhaps leading eventually to a formal peace treaty.
- **Zone of Separation.** A ZOS is a neutral space or no-man's land between cease-fire lines. This is a term now being used in the context of intra-state conflict instead of the term Buffer Zone which was more appropriate to inter-state conflict. The width of the ZOS may be based on visual distances or weapon ranges. Out of visual sight is preferable as it reduces the temptation of ill-disciplined soldiers to take casual sniping at one another. A ZOS is normally only a demilitarised zone from which the armed forces of both sides are excluded. However, the zone is the sovereign territory of at least one of the parties whose rights of administration must be recognised.

- **Control Zones.** Control Zones are areas on either side of a ZOS, the forward limits of which will be the cease-fire line. In these areas limits are set for numbers of personnel, tanks, artillery (by calibre), mortars and missiles (rockets) permitted in the control zone at any one time, or during any particular period.

e. Supervision of Truces and Managing a Cease-fire

PSF may be deployed to supervise any commitments stated in a UNSC mandate. Tasks will generally be agreed and specified in the detail of the agreement or treaty. Cease-fires normally depend on a clear geographical delineation and an agreed time scale for their implementation. However, in more volatile circumstances, and when parties' forces are intermingled, the best that may be achieved could be a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal to camp.

f. Establishment of Protected or Safe Areas

Such areas may contain residents, refugees, displaced persons and substantial numbers of forces of one or more of the belligerent forces. Forces may be charged with the establishment and supervision of such areas and to provide support and assistance to other organisations within the safe area. The first stage in any PSO designed to protect or make an area safe is to demilitarise that area and this in itself may require enforcement actions.

The purpose of organising safe areas would be to:

- Ensure control of the population.
- Give inhabitants security from hostile action.
- Prevent hostile elements assisting others with supplies.
- Permit the security forces greater freedom of action.


Safe areas have to be supported by patrols and mobile reserves, also possibly by artillery and air support. The following may be needed for a network of safe areas within a controlled area:

- Safe areas should be placed under the authority of an overall COM.
- PSF should assist the local authorities in training suitable guards to undertake the following tasks:
 - Patrolling the area.
 - Checking people entering and leaving the area.
 - Assisting the police in enforcing control measures.
- The villages might have to be fortified according to the threat assessment. This could include perimeter wire, fire trenches with overhead cover, communication trenches, strong points and good fields of fire.
- There must be a foolproof system of communication between safe areas on the one hand and mobile reserves on the other, including telephone, radio, coloured rockets, lights, sirens and locally improvised methods such as drums and flares.

g. Demilitarisation and Arms Control Issue

Demilitarisation or arms control may be one of the tasks given to a PSF under the terms of its mandate, or they may be local, tactical initiatives attempted to reduce tension in a specific area. In general, demilitarisation and arms control measures will only be possible once a cease-fire or peace agreement is in place. Demilitarisation and arms controls will normally be a progressive process; its targets will be set and achieved in recognised steps. Steps which will require considerable verification and policing by the PSF are likely to be as shown in the following paragraphs:

- **Withdrawal** from front lines. Following a cease-fire agreement PSF will normally be deployed along the old front lines - the CFL. The first stage of demilitarisation will be a withdrawal from these wartime positions either to barracks or more usually outside an established ZOS. The aim of the ZOS is to move belligerent's back, beyond small arms range and ideally outside line of sight.
- **Establishment of a Light Forces Area.** The withdrawal of heavy weapons a specified distance from the cease-fire line will establish a LFA that the PSF can monitor and that way offer a significant confidence-building measure. Heavy weapons should include main battle tanks, towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, air defence weapons, mortars and all types of armoured fighting vehicles.
- **Return to barracks.** Having separated the former belligerents, the next step is to return the troops to barracks, or to new cantonment sites. The aim of this is to move troops into peace-time locations that can be monitored



Picture 10: Example of weapons storage site.

and from which a potential belligerent will have to deploy from. Such a move will also assist with the demilitarisation of the civilian population as weapons are collected.

- **Force levels and restructuring.** The next stage would be the agreement of force levels and the restructuring of former belligerents into peacetime organisations. Force levels will normally be agreed at the national level - often as part of any cease-fire agreement or peace agreement. The restructuring will generally follow direction from the senior military HQ and involve suitability assessments, verification and advice from units at the tactical level.

h. Agreed Withdrawal of Combatants

The agreement to evacuate regular and paramilitary forces from the ZOS must be implemented as soon as possible after the arrival of the PSF. The PSF should establish OP's and positions as close to the edge of the ZOS or CFL as possible in order to dominate the local area. Establishing section posts, which are directly controlled from a Coy base, usually effects a presence. This enables each Coy to rotate and rest sections, and to keep sufficient troops in reserve, at varying states of readiness, to meet emergencies.

i. Humanitarian Relief

Humanitarian relief is conducted to alleviate human suffering, especially in circumstances where responsible authorities in the area are unable or unwilling to provide adequate support to the population. Humanitarian relief may be conducted in the context of a PSO, or as an independent task, and may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian organisations. Such operations may be in response to earthquake, flood, famine, and radioactive, biological or chemical contamination. They may also be a consequence of war or the flight from political, religious or ethnic persecution.

3.4. Operating Techniques and Procedures

a. Control Measures

Close physical control can be exercised by the routine presence of military units and troops, and the use of specific techniques and operations such as cordon and search operations, or other combat operations. Control measures may take several forms such as Restricted Air and Maritime Zones, Guards and CP's. Military operations will usually require control to be established either to monitor, limit or deny access to many areas. This may be achieved by the use of guards and guard ships, air exclusion zones (for the restriction of war supplies, for example) and CP's, including VCP's to monitor the movement of displaced persons or refugees. Duties, procedures and the required tactics will depend on the authority of the mandate, any SOFA, ROE and the PSF SOP. ROE must clearly define the orders for opening fire. At the tactical level,

guards and CP's may constitute a major interface between the contingent and local populace. Measures within an area, which has been brought under control, should be designed to protect the people, and enable the authorities to function.

Account should be taken of the need to:

- Redress grievances and, where necessary, improve standards of living.
- Deter hostile activity, harassment and particularly subversion.
- Encourage the provision of information.
- Make the conduct of operations by the security forces easier.

The reasons for imposing control measures need to be explained and the measures discontinued if they fail to produce the desired result. Some possible measures are:

- Enforcing of banned political activities.
- Registration of civilians.
- Frequent inspection at irregular intervals of identity cards, permits and passes.
- Control of food, crops, arms, ammunition, explosives, drugs and medicines.
- Restrictions on civilian movement.
- Curfews.

In this context a COM should not rule out the use of infantry support weapons, artillery, air power and possibly the availability of naval or marine capabilities. The ROE for the use of these weapons in a PSO situation would be provided by the force lead organisation (UN, NATO or EU) and cleared by each TCN for the operation, but the tactical deployment and use of the troops concerned would be on the lines of those utilised in general war. Artillery for instance could be deployed to support patrolling activity, OP's and in larger scale operations.

b. Sectors

Control can be more effectively co-ordinated and executed if military sector boundaries are harmonised with in-place aid agency structures and deployments, political and civil authority boundaries and the locations and deployments of belligerent forces. When possible, headquarters and troop locations should be positioned within sectors to demonstrate the impartial and even handed approach being taken by a PSF.

c. Delineation Procedures

The following procedures and factors should be used and considered when delineating a CFL, ZOS or control zone:

- The designated line or area should be clearly marked on a common large-scale chart, map or air photograph.
- Prepare an accurate, detailed description of the line using a common grid system. If the two parties use different grid systems the line must be

- recorded in both. The written description is the legal authority.
- The line or area should, if possible, be physically identifiable.
 - The lines on the ground should be surveyed and marked.
 - Entry points to the zones should be agreed and clearly marked on the map and ground.
 - A record of the lines, signed by all sides, should be given to the parties concerned, with the original retained by the PSF. Alterations should be signed and promulgated in the same way.
 - The criteria used to determine critical terrain in war are not necessarily applicable to PSO. A road, a road junction or a village in low ground may be of more significance than high ground overlooking the area. Securing the use of facilities is often more important than obtaining a good field of fire.
 - Appreciate the economic considerations when determining a line so that a farmer is not summarily denied access to water for his animals nor a route to market blocked without good reason.
 - A PSF needs to consider areas and places of high emotional significance to any of the WF's. These could include religious sites, relics, areas of historical significance, places of burial and sites of murders, assassination or massacre.

3.5. Rural Operations

The characteristics of rural operations are the relatively open nature of the countryside provides scope for mobile operations and the use, where these are justified, of heavier weapons and aviation.

3.6. Urban Operations

a. Characteristics

Cities and towns are the focus of economic and political power. They are especially vulnerable to street violence and other disturbances both for this reason and because complex modern urban life can be so easily and effectively disrupted, with consequential widespread publicity. Urban operations are likely to continue to be an important feature of PSO in many areas of the world. The level of intensity at which operations are conducted will be the subject of careful consideration by the appropriate authorities. Maps of all key urban areas, houses, and underground systems, including details of accessibility, should be held in the surveyors or public works departments of the local government. The information gained from civil sources may need to be supplemented by reconnaissance.

b. Threats

The broad range of potential threats that could be adopted by an adversary in urban areas are:

- Disrupting industry and public services by strikes and sabotage.

- Generating widespread disturbances designed to stretch the resources of the security forces.
- Attacks against re-supply routes by damaging roads, bridges, rail links or air bases.
- Provoking military forces in the hope that they may overreact and provide material for hostile propaganda.
- Sniping at road blocks, static posts and sentries.
- Attacking vehicles and buildings with rockets, IED's and mortars.
- Ambushing patrols and firing on helicopters.
- Attacks against sympathetic members of the civilian population or employees.

c. Snipers

Because of the need for alertness, immediate action drills can usefully be devised for such circumstances as a patrol coming under fire from a sniper. This is always a particularly difficult situation as the source of the firing is seldom obvious. Depending on the situation it may be more suitable and appropriate to improve force protection procedures to prevent this occurring or mount a quick cordon and search operation if locations can be identified. In certain circumstances snipers may be deployed to reduce the risk of this type of action.

d. Operations below ground

Movement below ground is usually feasible in main towns and cities it may also be possible in smaller urban and suburban areas and even in some country districts. Operations below ground are merely an extension of surface operations, and COM's have to be aware of their scope and significance. Underground passages provide additional approaches and escape routes, which must be taken into account in planning the defence of installations.

3.7. Information Operations

a. General

INFOOPS is a term used to cover both Peace Support Psychological Activities and the media operations aspects of Public Information. The PSO force conducts Peace Support Psychological Activities directly at the population of the State receiving the mission and, indirectly, the military contingents and civilian agencies involved in the operation. Media Operations are designed to provide accurate information to the media. This includes both the local media, with its shared and cultural roots, and the international media. INFOOPS are an integral element of manoeuvre approach to the conduct of operations and should be fully coordinated with other activities and operations of the PSF, in order to reinforce the overall message that the COM wishes to portray in a credible, reasonable and consistent way. How to conduct Peace Support Psychological Activities depends on local circumstances and culture. The use of hand-outs and leaflets or a radio and TV station manned by members

of the force should be included in all PSO and be put into use as soon as possible. Information activity planning should start early and form an integral element of deep operations within the overall campaign plan.

b. Principles

The following general principles should govern the conduct of any information programme:

- **Impartiality.** In PSO nothing should be communicated that might prejudice any perceptions concerning the impartiality of the PSF. However, that should not exclude statements concerning culpability when evidence is irrefutable.
- **Timeliness.** To be effective, INFOOPS must be timely. All activities and operations should be analysed from the perspectives of the media HN and parties to the conflict so that appropriate responses are prepared.
- **Cultural Knowledge.** A thorough understanding of local culture, including linguistic dialects, is vital. Every effort should be made to gain this understanding. Social-cultural studies and opinion surveys need to be conducted to identify prevailing attitudes and expose any misconceptions and misunderstandings that can then be subsequently addressed through any information programme.
- **Harmonisation.** As activities that determine and influence perceptions, information projects have to be centrally co-ordinated with other activities that seek similar goals. These will include military intelligence, civil-military projects and community relations projects.

Annex:

B: Information Operations and Psychological Operations - Definitions.

4. Logistics

The first thing to consider when looking at the logistic concept of any PSO is what the lead organisation of the mission is (UN, NATO or EU).

The operational environment has a great impact upon the administrative support logistics system. In general, the administrative support system must initially be adjusted both physically and organisationally to the most probable operational environment and further be capable of rapid adjustment to changes therein, whether imposed or directed by the COM. The support component of a PSO provides the administrative and logistic support services that enable the mission to carry out its core function in an effective, coordinated and timely manner consistent with the regulations and procedures prescribed by the mission HQ or TCN's.

The PSF COM is responsible for establishing the logistic requirements for

all phases of an operation, and for co-ordination of logistic planning and support within his AOR.

The planning and co-ordination of logistic support is normally delegated to the logistic branch. The logistic branches at all level HQ's must prepare in advance and estimate in time when and where logistics support must be delivered. Lack of supplies, water, spare parts, and adequate transportation regulations etc may very soon reduce the efficiency of the whole unit.

If logistics are supported from TCN's a NSE will be established responsible for coordinating national logistical matters. Clear rules for the support managed by UN/NATO/EU respectively the TCN will be provided through the MOU's.

Execution of logistic support will be performed by logistics units on all levels.

ARRIVING LOGISTICALLY WELL PREPARED CAN BE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE ABILITY OF THE CONTINGENT TO FULLFIL ITS ROLE.

<p><u>Class I</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - fresh food - combat rations - bulk water - bottled water 	<p><u>Class III (POL)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - fuel - oil & lubricants - gas
<p><u>Class II</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - TO&E - spare parts 	<p><u>Class IV</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - construction materials - Non-TO&E
	<p><u>Class V</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ammunition & explosives

Picture 11: Classes of Supply in NATO and EU missions.

4.1. Logistical functions

Logistic are those aspects of military operations dealing with:

a) Supply (Procurement, distribution and salvage of supplies).

b) Maintenance, recovery and repair

The terms maintenance, recovery and repair are used in various meanings. Their task will always be to retain materiel in serviceable condition and/or to restore to their serviceability.

Maintenance can also be used with the meaning:

- All actions (including supply and repair) necessary to keep a force in condition to carry out its mission.
- Routine work to keep a facility in such condition that it can be utilised.

- c) **Transportation** (Movement of personnel and supplies).
- d) **Medical support** (Evacuation, hospitalisation, medicines and medical supplies).
- e) **Finance** (Exchange, payments, procurement etc.).
- f) **Other services** (Hygiene and clothing, use of labour maintenance of routes, accommodation etc.).

4.2. Command and Control in UN operations

TCN's have responsibility for meeting major equipment and self-sustainment standards as specified in the COE Manual and Re-supply of any item required under Wet/Dry lease agreement for major equipment and self-sustainment.

A wet lease is a contingent-owned equipment reimbursement system where the TCN assumes responsibility for maintaining and supporting major and minor items of equipment deployed. The TCN is entitled to reimbursement for providing this maintenance support.

A dry lease is a contingent-owned equipment reimbursement system whereby the TCN provides equipment to a PK mission and the UN assumes responsibility for maintaining the equipment or the UN arranges with a third party for maintenance of the equipment.

In overall control of the operational logistics support system is the CAO, who is appointed by and is responsible to the UN HQ in New York. Controlling and directing the day-to-day logistics support of the Force, its Bn's and companies is the CLO, who is a military staff member of the Force HQ.

ISS co-ordinates mission assets. Mission assets must be distributed to all mission components on a just basis, depending on functional need and assessed priorities. Delivering common support services is part of the administrative functions of a mission and thus falls under the responsibility of the CAO, who has up-to date information on the status of all resources available within the mission and direct access to all available means of acquiring items.

The CAO and his staff coordinate the whole external support programme for keeping the Force's logistics stock holdings at the required levels, and also acting as the link between the Force and the government departments of the host country or countries for all matters concerning:

- Procurement and local supply.
- Financial arrangements (payments and budget).
- Civilian transportation.
- Employment of local civilian staff.
- Troop rotations.
- Movement control.
- Accommodation and hiring.
- Use of civil communication facilities (e.g. radio, telephone service).
- Postal and welfare facilities.

4.3. Command and Control in NATO and EU operations

TCN's have the responsibility for equipping their forces and for ensuring, individually or by cooperative arrangements, the provision of required logistics resources to support the forces assigned to multinational operations. Special arrangements concerning logistics will be stipulated in MOU's and their TAs.

Nations and NATO or EU authorities have a collective responsibility for logistic support of multinational operations. This collective responsibility encourages nations and the lead organisation to cooperatively share the provision and use of logistic capabilities and resources to support the force effectively and efficiently.

5. Civil - Military Cooperation

5.1. General

CIMIC is the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the PSO military COM and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies. The immediate aim is to fully coordinate civilian and military activities to support humanitarian projects and to achieve the maximum support for the operation, at the expense of any opposition.

The long-term aim of generating sufficient stability and self-dependency is directly linked to the desired end state and exit strategy. This activity should reduce overall dependency on external aid. Civil-military considerations should play a significant role in a COM's estimate and planning process, both to identify tasks and operational constraints. It is vital that the civil-military programme is fully integrated into the overall campaign plan, and the day-to-day conduct of operations.

Coordination is necessary to ensure that the civil-military programme reinforces, and is in turn reinforced by, activities designed to foster good community relations. This coordination should take place at every level and be reinforced by the community information programme. A fully coordinated and positive civil-military program will be a critical element in the success of any campaign. Civil-military activities may cover a wide range of activities within local communities.

The military assistance will normally be to protect and create secure conditions for personnel involved, but there might also be commitment of military specialists such as engineers, medical officers, military police and others.

National initiatives to use own personnel of the PSF to solve civilian tasks, beyond those demanded by the needs of the own military units, must be in accordance with the main guidelines of the mission and sanctioned at the highest level of PSO-Command before they are carried out. This decision must consider the reactions of the different parties, the demand for impartiality and its effect on the accomplishment of the military task. Basically civilian

tasks should be carried out by civil organisations, assisted by PSF's in matters of protection and security.

In UN lead operations tasks that can be seen as very similar to CIMIC are referred to as CIM-COORD.

5.2. Principles

In UN lead missions the coordination of humanitarian assistance lies in the domain of the humanitarian DSRSG. In other missions there is no clearly defined holder of the responsibility. To cope with this challenge PSF in other than UN lead missions use the CIMIC concept to achieve an overview of the humanitarian situation.

In any mission area there will be different humanitarian needs, which have to be handled. The detection and collecting of information is essential in the planning process in order to make sound priorities and the necessary coordination prior to any execution of CIMIC related operations. It is vital to create "know-how" in the AOR, in order to be able to detect changes, which could cause future problems in one way or another. This is also important for the credibility of the involved organisations and military forces that they act impartial with a sincere concern for the civilian's well being.

The way to handle civil/humanitarian tasks is based on a few basic principles:

- The unit has to focus on its main military task and not use resources for other means, which could deflect badly on their efforts to fulfil their main task.
- When supporting non-military organisation, with civil-military operations do it by using military tactical and technical methods.
- Tasks with pure civilian character, solved by military units have to be sanctioned by a superior COM and his decision has to refer to the main guidelines for the operation.

5.3. Organisation

At the tactical level the timely and effective harmonisation and coordination of military activities with those of the civilian agencies is essential for success. Ultimately, coordination can only be achieved by consultation as these agencies have permanent mandates and agendas that may compete with each other and be different to those of the military force. Within a Bn the staff is responsible to cooperate and coordinate with different civilian organisations.

5.4. Civil - Military Tasks

Civil Military Tasks designed to support the civil development programme provide the linkage between security, stability and peace building and, as a PSO develops towards the end-state, the emphasis will switch from relief to re-construction and civil development. Within the guidelines and priorities established within the overall aid programme, projects in support of the local community may be conducted independently by the military, but more usually

in conjunction with and in support of civilian agencies, utilising local farms and facilities. Civil-military projects may cover a wide range of activities within local communities and, as such, should be controlled when possible by local authorities. The use of PSF assets to solving any of these tasks are to be seen as a last resort, when no suitable civilian assets are available.

Other potential tasks that could attract some form of limited CIMIC planning, depending on the circumstances, are as follows:

- Civil Administration - particularly where none appears to exist.
- Civil Defence Measures.
- Civil Labour.
- Control of property and cultural heritage.
- Public Welfare, Health, and Safety.
- Communications and Transportation.
- Information Services.
- Commerce and Supply Resources for the Civil Population.
- Education.

a. Refugees and Displaced Persons

The following list outlines some of the potential tasks that must be considered by the military component together with the civilian component regarding the handling of refugees and displaced persons:

- Estimate the number of refugees and displaced persons, their points of origin, and their anticipated direction of movement.
- Plan movement control measures, emergency care, and evacuation of refugees. Coordinate with military forces for transportation, military police support military intelligence screening/interrogation, and medical activities, as needed.
- Advise on or establish and supervise the operation of temporary or semi-permanent camps for refugees.
- Resettle or return refugees to their homes in accordance with government policy and objectives.
- Advise and assist the host country and other agencies on camps and relief measures for refugees.
- Supervise the conduct of movement plans for refugees.

b. Resettlement

Resettlement is normally implemented after negotiation and mediation between all relevant parties involved. This negotiation or mediation is conducted by the UN lead organisation such as UNHCR.

The PSF could involve:

- Establishing the necessary security by CP, liaison, escorting, patrolling and house search/clearing.
- Helicopter-support in order to detect refugees or displaced persons in difficult areas.
- Mine clearing of roads to make it possible to contact the refugees.

- Transportation of refugees or displaced persons to different refugee camps.
- Support the distribution of food and other supply to the refugees.

c. Mass graves and Exchange of prisoners


These tasks are normally handled by an international police presence, or specially mandated organisations like UNHCR or the War Crime Tribunal. They will be responsible to make necessary arrangements and measures for the excavation or the exchange etc. The PSF could be required secure the area in question in order to avoid intrusion or disturbance. There could also be need of mine clearing of the gravesite. When the PSF is required, liaison team between the civilian organisations, and if necessary the nearby population and the PSF has to be established.



Picture 12: Example of mass grave site.

The co-ordination should cover the following items:

- Estimating the general security situation for all parties involved.
- Ethnical problems.
- The extent of the task in time and space.
- Necessary equipment and resources provided by the PSF.
- Coordination with other military and police units.
- Communication and liaison between the parties.
- Coordinating plans of operation and the execution of orders.
- Contingency plans in case of an emergency.
- Media coverage.



Picture 13: Example of prisoner exchange.

The normal task for the military component is to protect and secure the area in question. The extent of this task could include the following measures:

- Blocking incoming roads, by setting up CP.
- Patrolling the area.
- Secure the area with a barbed wire fence.
- Escorting and transportation.

If mine clearing-capacity is required:

- Clarify for all personnel involved the danger-area of the mine clearing, which no one (except from the mine-clearing team) is allowed to appear within.
- The mine clearing has to be coordinated with the criminal-forensic team, which means that they have to work as close as possible in order to secure vital evidence for the further investigation.

5.5. The CIMIC officer

The role of a CIMIC officer could also be to provide, if any way possible, and within his capability, such assistance as the military COM requires in his dealings with the civil authorities and the civil community and civilian organisations. This could include:

- Evaluates community attitudes.
- Establishing good working relationships with leading personalities and community leaders so as to be able to advise his COM on the likely effects of certain policies and/or operations.
- Relationships thus established could assist in solving or improving those problems, which do arise, and which could be prejudicial to communal stability.

The CIMIC officer would in cooperation with the legal adviser report and assess claims for damage arising from searches or operations carried out by the military forces. This could include:

- Damage caused by military activities.
- Assisting the public with problems arising from civil disorders.
- Providing assistance and advice to persons affected by explosive devices.
- Refer matters raised by the military forces or police to the appropriate authorities and agencies and ensure that answers are received and passed on with the minimum of delay.
- Investigate complaints of a non-criminal nature directed against the military forces.

5.6. Measures

The following measures should be considered in order to achieve the best results regarding the implementation of CIMIC:

- Establish a CIMIC-meeting centre for the local population, civilian agencies, NGO's and the military. Here they can work on the objectives to reach and by which means.
- A MOU between the participating organisations, which clarify the responsibilities, and the objectives of the organisations.
- Central consultation.
- Co-location of staff-elements.
- The exchange of liaisons and communication equipment.

6. Communication and Information Systems

6.1. General

a. Different levels

The CIS may be considered at three levels in PSO's:

- **Strategic level** may be divided in two sublevels: politico-Military/grand strategic and Military-strategic/operational level. These levels compromise UNNY / NATO HQ / EU HQ and Operational COM.
- **Operational level** line of communication is between the FHQ and its divisions, and its operational subunits Div/Bde level (national/multinational).
- **Tactical level** line of communication is between Bde HQ, Bn's HQs and positions, OP's and patrols.

b. Responsibilities

In UN operations, communication between UNNY and Mission/FHQ is the responsibility of UN. Both radio and telephone systems on this level will normally be established, operated and maintained by Force Signals.

In EU / NATO operations, communication between Strategic HQ and Mission/FHQ is the responsibility of EU / NATO. EU may use the assets NATO has through the Berlin+ mechanism. This agreement enables the flexibility and availability in use of different means of CIS. One key difference between NATO and EU is that no permanent military structures exist within the latter, except for the planning cell. This is because no forces or command and control assets are permanently assigned.

Internal CIS for a unit (Bn etc.) are the responsibility of the unit. The equipment is provided by the TCN's. The Force may allocate some equipment to the unit for internal CIS. Maintenance of such equipment is the responsibility of the Force.

National units may have separate communication links with their home countries for official use and for welfare. The need for such links is decided by the nations and the links are established and maintained by the nations.

Each member of a mission regardless of rank or position is personally responsible for the CIS equipment issued to him.

The user is responsible for the following:

- To check that the equipment is functioning properly.
- To change parts listed in the user's manual.
- To clean and lubricate and to protect against rain, heat, dust, rust etc
- To check accessories.

- To make sure adequate power supply is available (including alternative source).
- To note and report all faults without delay.

c. Flexible CIS

A CIS is flexible when it is possible to dispatch the same message in more than just one way. Flexibility is important to ensure communication at all alert levels and to ensure that communication is not lost when units deploy to new areas.

It is also flexibility when the same CIS could be used not only for voice, but for telex, data and image transmission as well. This means that different technologies, such as HF-radio, VHF-radio, microwave links, satellite systems and cable (including the local telecommunications network in the mission area), may be used at the same time to create flexibility and interoperability. It is important to ensure that no unit is dependent on one CIS only.

d. Communication security

CIS will normally be equipped with some type of technical coding devices. There are no restrictions on the use of code words for certain activities such as deployment of units, deployment of weapons or the use of weapons. Modern CIS equipment used in recent PSO's is very much secured and coded, even the radios. Still any transmission should be expected to be monitored by one or several of the parties involved.

Parties involved may jam or interfere on all communication levels. This could be done intentionally or unintentionally. Normally flexibility and trained operators could overcome this kind of difficulties.

Communication procedures are mission specific and will be stated in SOP's.

e. CIS as used for Force Protection

CIS must also be seen as an effective method of increasing the safety of all members of a mission.

All static PSF positions must be able to report not only about tactical developments but also about accidents and dangerous situations concerning the PSF personnel.

Every PSO will have a reporting system for controlling movement of forces and vehicles, the set up will always be operation or nation specific and stipulated in mission SOP's.

As a rule no vehicle should be allowed to drive in the mission area without means of communication (radio, mobile telephone etc.). If the situation in the area permits and the alert level allows, convoys of three or more vehicles may have less radios or mobile telephones than the number of vehicles.

Any vehicle moving outside the area of its own unit must report to the unit in the area of which it is moving. A number of reporting stations could be established and any moving personnel could be required to report their location for example every 20 minutes.

6.2. Mobile networks

Mobile networks (mostly VHF) are used for vehicles and normally also internally in units such as Bn's for communication with OP's and patrols.

Mobile networks may be of different kinds, allowing only voice or including data capabilities. Data capability may include position reports using the GPS. A Force mobile network may be established using civilian equipment.

Mobile networks within units such as Bn's could be for operational and/or logistical use.

For vehicles and convoys moving over greater distances use of satellite system for data transmission and position reporting (with GPS) may be necessary. Alternate systems or backup system could be established with HF-means.

6.3. Fixed networks

Between Mission/FHQ and subordinate HQs (Bn's etc.) fixed networks could be established using microwave links, Force owned satellite systems or cable.

Fixed networks provide communication with voice, telex and teletype. Some networks may also be provided with capabilities for data transmission for transmission of data files, electronic mail etc.

Cable networks would normally be established by using the local telecommunication network in the mission area.

Flexibility for fixed networks is normally ensured by the use of commercial satellite systems, HF or even VHF. Fixed networks may also be established using wireless technology equipped with encryption devices.

Fixed networks are also established for use inside a unit such as a Bn using the same technologies as mentioned above. At this level, cable networks may be established with own cable and/or the local telecommunication network. Use of local telephone communication networks depends on the existing infrastructure. Local networks should be used mainly for welfare communication and as a backup network.

Whenever possible, CIS should be established on several levels between the PSF and parties involved. In order to avoid monitoring by other parties such CIS used for liaison must not under any circumstances be established by using any kind of unsecured radio technology.

Annexes:

C: UN Communication and Information System Levels

D: Example showing Battalion radio network.

7. Training

7.1. General

The individual soldier's skill is based on the level of skill reached during basic military training in his/her home country, which should give him/her a satisfactory basis for later PSO training.

This manual presupposes that the individual soldier has his basic military training behind him/her, although it is essential to undergo a certain period of training to standardize the military performance of a member of a PSO.

TRAINING IMPROVES THE MORALE AND MAINTAINS SKILLS AND SELF-CONFIDENCE.

7.2. Pre-mission training

An officer responsible for pre-mission training should be appointed, who plans, executes and follows up on the training and defines training, which needs to be complemented in the mission area.

The pre-mission training could be divided in the following phases:

- Mandatory training (e.g. weapon training, emergency first aid, live firing, mine awareness, CBRN, ROE, gender, etc).
- Specialist training (e.g. drivers, medics, staff personnel, special weapon training, etc).
- Mission specified training (e.g. OP and CP duties, patrolling, CRC, Search operations, staff work, etc).
- Final unit exercise with all unit components with a scenario according to the situation in the current mission area.

EFFECTIVE PRE-MISSION TRAINING HELPS THE UNIT TO START THE MISSION.

The level of all pre-mission training is dependent of the status of the units experience, knowledge, equipment and environmental factors. The following subjects are examples of subjects, which could be included in pre-mission training:

- ROE / Use of force.
- OP and CP duties, including techniques.
- Patrolling by day and by night.
- Live firing.
- Fire fighting.
- CBRN.
- CRC training.
- Signal training.
- Recognition of militias and arms.
- Knowledge of the weapons used in AO.

- Mine awareness training.
- Construction works / Engineer works.
- Emergency first aid / CASEVAC.
- Up-to-date information about the mission and mission area, including attitude and conduct, cultural awareness as well as security and safety matters.
- Map reading / Use of GPS.
- Transport training.
- Driving training.
- Language training.
- Helicopter Drills.

During the period of Pre-mission training some emphasis on team building is desirable.

7.3. Training in the mission area

a. Unit training

Unit training is organized by the COM or an appointed officer. Plans and schedules with defined aims are to be made before the rotation period and the deployment in the mission area. Training activities stated in SOP are to be taken into consideration when planning.

Complementary training of pre-mission training may be needed in the mission area.

The aim at unit level is to create an effective and solid unit, which will be capable of acting as a part in a PSO. This will be achieved by training in all sub-units. When a sufficient level is reached, unit exercises (Coy-Bn) have to be carried out. When a unit works integrated with other nations it is important to conduct joint exercises as soon as possible after deployment in the mission area.

Training is a way of showing force without being provocative. This can prevent many unnecessary clashes between the parties in the area.

The following operational duties should be trained depending of mission and tasks:

- ROE / Use of force.
- Live firing.
- Readiness.
- OP/camp defence.
- Search operations.
- CRC.
- Fire fighting.
- Guarding, patrolling, OP and CP duties.
- Acting as reserves.
- Reinforcing a position.
- Closing off an area, unit size tailing operations.
- Mine awareness training.
- First aid training / CASEVAC.

b. Individual training

The performance and efficiency of the unit is based on the individual soldier's skill and the level of unit training reached in the pre-mission training. The training to become an efficient soldier in a PSO certainly takes more than what can be achieved by any pre-mission training.

In times of intense operational activity, there will not be much time for individual training. But during calmer periods this basic training becomes important in order to keep up the efficiency level of the personnel, and the unit as a whole.

Physical training is essential to maintain operational capability and physical- and physiological fitness as well as it keeps up the morale in the unit.

Everyone should master the following topics. They can be trained at lower unit level but should be checked from time to time:

- ROE / Use of force.
- Personal weapons handling.
- Emergency first aid.
- Mine awareness.
- Communications.
- Fire fighting.
- Map reading.
- Physical capability.

Certain specialist personnel need comprehensive courses dealing with subjects within their specific areas. Such groups will be tank crews, APC gunners and drivers, ATG and mortar crews, medics and those operating technically sophisticated devices. Necessary instructors are usually provided through the national training system.

Job rotation is a way to raise the quality of a unit. Job rotation could be executed on individual basis as well as between units. Job rotation gives the individual soldier higher understanding of other components in the unit as well as he/her will be more useful when required skills in topics outside his/her normally daily duties.

Job rotation could also be done on multinational level that improves the understanding for neighbouring units and their national operational techniques that could be useful in joint operations.

Examples of job rotation:

- Machinegun drills for drivers / driver skills for gunners.
- Guarding/CP duties for staff personnel.
- Driving-training to require driver permits.
- Exchange of soldiers / squads to neighbouring units.

8. Liaison

8.1. General

In present day PSO Liaison and co-ordination at all levels is of utmost importance since they tend to be:

- Both multinational and multilingual.
- Conducted in theatres where no or few willing military structures of co-operation exist.

8.2. Liaison with Friendly Military Forces

Liaison with Friendly Military Forces will normally take one of the following forms:

- Cross Boundary Liaison. PSF units will normally be given an AOR. This will demand cross boundary liaison between neighbouring units. This liaison will aim to:
 - Ensure de-confliction of tasks and duties performed by PSO forces.
 - Encourage cross boundary support and medical assistance.
 - Ensure the effective conduction of cross boundary operations.
- Liaison through the Chain of Command. Chain of Command liaison will among other things assist with two main challenges:
 - Language barriers.
 - Passage of Information.

8.3. Liaison with the Civil Authorities

It is essential to establish good liaison with the Civil Authorities such as the local police, coastguards, air traffic controllers and any fire services and hospitals etc. in the AO.

8.4. Liaison with International Organisations

A PSF will rarely operate alone within a theatre of operations. It will usually find itself working alongside numerous IO's, many of whom will have been working there for a longer period and are working for their own independent agenda. The PSF will benefit considerably from co-ordinating its activities with other organisations involved in the theatre. A PSF will also have to identify any commitment it has under its mandate for the security of any international organisations.

8.5. Liaison with Warring Factions

All levels of command within the PSF should normally attempt liaison with WF's host nations or other entities. There should be established liaison at all levels of military command including possible UNMO's. This will provide liaison

with key civil, military and police COM's. A liaison plan has to be adopted to ensure de-confliction of responsibilities between different LNO's and to ensure the timely and accurate passage of information up the chain of command. In particular, responsibilities for liaison with specific WF commands/levels of command have to be established.

Generally liaison tasks with WF's are as follows:

- **Negotiations.** The need to negotiate will depend on the mandate, the force structure and its level of dependency on host nation support or on WF goodwill.
- **Cease-fire Violations.** The placing of LNO's at WF HQ will assist in the resolution of any cease-fire violations. Not only will it allow a rapid assessment of which party is the aggressor, but it will assist the military COM in preventing an escalation of the violation, or reprisals. Co-ordinated and timely negotiations can be conducted concurrently with opposing military COM's to bring about a return to stability or a cease-fire.
- **Protests/Briefs.** The requirement for briefings to host nations/WF on future operations and the requirement to protest breaches of any cease-fire or peace agreement will depend entirely on the nature of the mandate.

8.6. Liaison with the opposing parties

Liaison teams can be deployed within the Bn AOR to help the Bn COM's to liaise with the parties involved. When ever possible Bn and Coy COM's will establish a "hot line" linking their command posts with those of their opposite numbers. Regular meetings should be held to discuss routine problems. In emergency situations, the "hot line" is used to arrange immediate meetings.

Liaison at unit level on matters of local interests between a unit and local authorities may be established on the spot. The aim is to ensure that incidents are dealt with at the lowest possible level before they escalate.

8.7. The Liaison Officer

The LNO must behave with respect to all parties and cultural awareness. The basic tasks of the LNO are as follows:

- Establish and maintain contacts with local authorities, military elements, Gendarmerie and local militia, civilian organisations (NGO/IO), and UN organisations located in the Bn AOR.
- Initiate and arrange liaison meetings.
- Ensure that excellent cooperative image of the PSF among the population throughout the AOR is maintained.
- Ensure that the civilian population knows the objective of the PSF.
- Ensure that requests for liaison assistance from the civilian population are met.

- Coordinate and cooperate with observers as required.
- Ensure that all unit and sub-unit COM's are always informed about prevailing conditions inside and outside the AOR.
- Report changes in the situation.

9. Negotiation

9.1. General

Negotiation and mediation is to reach agreements to which all parties have concurred in order to de-escalate and resolve the conflict. Negotiation (and liaison) is an essential part of any PSO.

When a neutral party assists by acting between the opposed parties in an effort to bring them together, it is referred to as mediation. Negotiation and mediation may be conducted independently but more normally as an adjunct to other conflict resolution activities.

All service personnel could be involved, from senior COM's meeting with faction leaders, to individual soldiers at isolated observation points who may find themselves trying to control an incident or arbitrating in a local dispute.

Negotiation and mediation may be conducted as part of a deliberate process or as an immediate response to a life-threatening incident. In these cases, it is important to remember that the negotiator representing the PSF handling the incident is often perceived as part of the problem. When there is no chain of command, identifying other people of influence, such as the local mayor or religious leader, could be crucial in resolving the problem.

9.2. Political Issues

The most important negotiations will be aimed at achieving an overall political agreement between the parties. Successful political negotiations provide the framework and direction within which humanitarian and military activities take place. It may prove difficult or impossible to reach formal agreements if a government has broken down or in territory where the de facto government is not recognised by the international community.

9.3. Humanitarian Issues

Representatives of humanitarian agencies may need to negotiate for access to assess humanitarian needs with a host government or with local military or police units. Having made a 'needs assessment', the humanitarian agency may need to agree with the host government or the local COM's on the assessment and methods of supply and distribution. Once the humanitarian agency has the supplies, it may have to negotiate with the parties on a case by case basis for access to supply relief to the target population. No matter what agreement may have been reached beforehand, actual distribution can take a great deal of negotiation as convoys can be halted locally on the whim of a local militia COM.

9.4. Military Issues

Military COM's may have to negotiate the terms on which they will deploy in support of political or humanitarian agreements. It is important for the military COM to ensure that he is not committed to an operation that is militarily unsustainable.

Military representatives may be involved in negotiating cease-fires that can take three stages:

1. Getting the parties to reach an internal political agreement that they want a cease-fire.
2. Achieving a military agreement on how to conduct the cease-fire.
3. Negotiating a workable implementation of the agreement on the ground.

PSF will negotiate with the parties for FoM to monitor and enforce political or military agreements, such as cease-fires or demilitarisation. Agreements made at a higher level may need to be renegotiated case by case for example to establish observation posts, cross confrontation lines, or to monitor troop deployments once a separation of forces from a confrontation line has been agreed on.

9.5. Negotiators

There may be scope for establishing a negotiating team to deal with routine matters in order to allow the COM to step in, either to add weight when negotiations are in danger of failing, or to finalise agreements. Negotiators should have the sufficient rank, status, and credibility compared with the rest of the parties. Negotiating teams may include experts from different branches. Large delegations should be avoided.

9.6. Coordinated Objectives

Different negotiators from the PSF may talk to the same leaders of the parties. This should be avoided by having the PSF de-conflicting local negotiation counterparts. If they are going to have any success in their negotiations, individually or collectively, they need to be coordinated. This can be achieved by providing clear direction from the highest level on what objectives should be sought from negotiations and where it is possible to compromise. There are needs to keep up regular liaison between the agencies and individuals engaged in negotiations at each level.

9.7. Guidelines

There are no fixed principles for negotiation but there are several essential features of any negotiation that are useful guidelines for achieving results that can be further developed. These are:

- **Impartiality.** If parties believe a negotiator is no longer impartial, their trust, cooperation, and open-hearted relationship will be lost and negotiations probably will be unsuccessful.
- **Long-Term View.** Negotiators should recognise that it takes time to change from opposing positions to common ground and to establish a culture of negotiations in which the parties become used to meeting and solving small problems together in preparation for handling crises and tackling larger problems. A short-term negotiating success, won by conceding an apparently small point, may be damaging and set a long-term precedent.
- **Imagination.** Imagination and lateral approaches are vital for the identification of common ground between the parties, development of incentives and disincentives, and finding ways to overcome the many barriers in conducting successful negotiations.
- **Acting with Determination.** The parties will have more at stake and may have fewer constraints on their actions than negotiators from the international community. Faced with parties under emotional pressure, the negotiator or representative must also be prepared to act with determination.
- **Cultural Awareness.** Negotiators should be aware of how cultural issues may inflict on their negotiations.

9.8. Techniques

Military COM's should be aware of the complications created by certain features of a negotiation and need to address the following issues before and during the process of any negotiations that occur:

- The identification of decision-makers during negotiations.
- The use and exploitation of the media during and after the negotiations.
- The security of decision-makers.
- The use of two track negotiations.
- Communications and mobility.
- Maintaining secrecy and confidentiality.
- The political recognition of parties to the negotiation.
- The use of joint commissions.
- The use of interpreters and translators.

9.9. Process

The selection of individuals, or groups of individuals, who are acceptable to the parties, is fundamental to the successful conduct of negotiations. Essentially there are three stages in the process of negotiation and mediation:

Stage 1 - Preparation. A clear aim should be defined to determine what is to be achieved. This will take into account many factors including the

objectives and capabilities of the belligerents as well as a realistic judgement of what is possible. In practice, the initial aim may be no more than to get competing factions to meet, and future objectives may be discussed and refined during subsequent meetings.

Specific preparations will include researching the background, history and status of the issue to be discussed to help the negotiator or mediator to identify those arguments that the belligerent parties may employ.

Identification of options, limitations, minimum requirements, areas of common interest, and possible compromises are essential. The PSF negotiator has to be clear on those points that must be won or protected and those that may be used as bargaining chips.

If possible a thorough study of the participants who will attend the meeting should be made. This should include their cultural origin, personality, authority, influence, habits and attitudes.

If hosting the meeting, specific arrangements should take account of the following:

- **Location.** In the conduct of formal negotiations or mediation the site should be secure and neutral. Other important considerations of the location are accessibility, communications and comfort. In the control of an incident those persons relevant to defusing the problem should be identified and persuaded to conduct negotiations away from those more immediately involved in the incident.
- **Administration.** Administrative organisation should include such items as arrival and departure arrangements, and the provision of parking, communications, meals and refreshment. The meeting should have an agenda, a seating plan and note-takers, perhaps supplemented with interpreters and other advisers on specialist subjects. Separate rooms will probably be required by each party to allow them to confer in private.
- **Attendance.** Attendance should be at an appropriate and equal rank level. Offence may be caused if senior representatives from one faction are required to meet with junior representatives from another. To avoid unmanageable numbers attending, the size of each party should, where possible, be agreed in beforehand. A policy on the carriage of weapons and protection teams should be announced in advance.

Stage 2 - Conduct. In mediations the PSF force representative will act as a go-between to the parties of the conflict. In negotiations the PSF representative will act as an interest holder.

The first item on any agenda should be for the participants to agree upon the purpose of the meeting. If hosting the occasion, the PSF representative should offer the customary salutations and exchange of courtesy and to ensure that all parties are identified and have been introduced to each other. Refreshments should normally be offered or received. Introductory small talk is essential to make the participants feel more at ease.

Some basic guidelines for conducting negotiations are as follows:

- **Preserve Options.** The opposing sides should be encouraged to give their views first. This will enable the negotiator to re-assess the viability of his position. If possible, he should avoid taking an immediate stand and he should never make promises.
- **Restraint and Control.** Belligerent parties are often deliberately inflexible. They may distort information and introduce false problems to distract attention from discussions that might embarrass them. Visible frustration, impatience, a patronising manner, or anger at such may undermine the negotiator's position. Loss of face is likely to increase the belligerence of faction leaders. Wherever possible, respect should be shown for the negotiating positions of other parties. Speakers should not be interrupted; unless incorrect information and matters of principle are to be corrected, with appropriate evidence. Facts should take preference over opinions. Whilst remaining impartial, the negotiations should be conducted in a firm, fair and friendly manner. Don't give any information about the opposite side, which can be of value to the counterpart. Always be restrained if the counterpart expresses anything about the PSF or the morale, methods, politics of the opposite side etc. Try to get the counterpart to accept a possible solution, which the PSF has prepared.
- **Argument.** If necessary, the negotiator should remind participants of previous agreements, arrangements, accepted practices and their own pronouncements. However, this should be done tactfully and accurately with regard to facts and detail.
- **Compromise.** Partial agreement or areas of consensus should be carefully explored for compromise solutions. Related common interests may offer answers to seemingly intractable differences.
- **Linkage.** Linkage is the connecting of aims to each other. For example making the achievement of one aim a precondition to achieving another.
- **Summary.** Negotiation and mediation should be finalised with a summary of what has been resolved. The summary has to be agreed upon by all participants and, if possible, written down and signed by each party. Time and place for further negotiation should also be agreed upon. The outcome and the process of the meeting should be handled with discretion.

Stage 3 - Follow-up. Effective follow-up is as important as successful negotiation. Without a follow-up, achievements by negotiation or mediation could be lost. The outcome of the negotiations or mediation has to be promulgated to all interested parties. Background files should be updated with all relevant information, including personality profiles of the participants. Agreements have to be monitored, implemented or supervised as soon as possible. The immediate period following a negotiated agreement is likely to

Chapter IV: Lessons learned

1. General

One of the main challenges of PSO's is a steady renewal of personnel involved in the operations. This is due to rotation of troops and the formation of new operations. The challenge is to learn from the innovations and problems solved in earlier operations as not to waste efforts in challenges that have already been solved.

This may be done by forming a LL databank accessible to officers involved in PSO's and the setting up of new operations.

A LL is a clear and comprehensive stand-alone statement. It should identify, explain and recommend better ways of doing things or ways of overcoming problems. It should also be used to expand the bank of knowledge about military training and operations.

A LL can cover any operation involving troops, observers, civilian police or monitors or their equipment. It can cover any phase of an operation such as training, planning, deployment or redeployment and it could also cover any subject such as personnel matters, operational matters, intelligence matters, logistic matters etc.

Matters to be covered by LL occur on all levels, Strategic, Operational and Tactical level. In many cases LL inflict on more than one level and should therefore be taken into consideration by the planning at all levels where it is pertinent.

The LL process could be described in 5 phases: Planning, Collection, Analysing, Storing and Dissemination.

- **Planning** could be based on known needs, for example when planning a new operation. It could also be based on previous analyses, different new tasks or questions and information from outside the own organisation.
- **Collection** can be done in different ways. It should be an active collection by the actors serving in the operation, (the actors " in the field") or it could be an active search for LL by trained observers or a combination of the above mentioned examples. There should be an officer responsible for the gathering and forwarding of LL starting at least from the Coy level.
- **Storing** may be done in different ways either archived on paper or more desirable stored in a databank. The main consideration when storing LL is that the information is accessible for future use and analysing. (CONSIDERATION: The storage of LL should be done in a way that it can be used in a multinational environment therefore the use of English is recommended.)

- **Analysing** LL is an ongoing process. LL must be measured against operational needs and recommendations must be seen in the light of how they benefit the general operational capacity within the realms of available personnel and equipment. The analysing phase requires personnel with knowledge and experience.
- **Dissemination** of LL could be made via pamphlets, printouts, Internet or special seminars. Important LL should be included in the training of personnel destined to and serving in the operation.

The LL layout consists of six headings known as the "Six-liner" :

1. Title

- The title shall describe the area and the nature of the LL. Ex." Good maps are needed from the beginning of a new mission in order to avoid accidents" .

2. Observation

- The significant event which has been observed and which the LL is based upon.
- The observation shall include a short statement of the observed successes or problems. (What happened, what was the problem or success).

3. Description

- A complete description of the positive or negative observation, as well as its origin and causes.
- Place the LL into its context.
- Explain the background of the observation. (The origin, the context).

4. Lesson learned

- A LL is a distinct piece of information (experience), which will increase the value of the combined knowledge.
- To be legitimate as a LL, it shall describe how it increases the quality in comparison with previous experience and knowledge.
- (What did we learned? What is the value of it?).

5. Recommendation

- Describe the action needed to solve the problem or secure the success.
- Define the need to update, modify, clarify, create new or remove, entirely or partially, tactical conduct, SOPs or general guidelines. (Action to be taken. Need for updating guidelines).

6. Comments

- Any information that does not fit into one of the above headings.

2. Purpose

The main purpose of LL is to avoid spending time and effort on solving challenges, which have already been solved. Therefore it is recommended to use a LL mechanism.

The functions of a LL mechanism could be the following:

- To make and process lessons learned from PSO's.
- To recommend the application of LL from PSO's to ongoing and future operations.
- To monitor the application of LL and of recommendations derived from them.
- To develop the LL procedures and make it easily available to officers, at HQ, in the field, involved in all aspect of PSO, including their planning, management and support.

ANNEX A

NATO Command and Control relationship - Definitions

Full Command

The military authority and responsibility of a COM to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. Note: the term "command" as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO or coalition COM has full command over the forces assigned to him since, in assigning forces to NATO, nations will delegate only operational command or operational control.

Operational Command

The authority granted to a COM to assign missions or tasks to subordinate COM's, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the COM deems necessary. Note: it does not include responsibility for administration.

Operational Control

The authority delegated to a COM to direct forces assigned so that the COM may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

Tactical Command

The authority delegated to a COM to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

Tactical Control

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

Information Operations and Psychological Operations - Definitions

Information Operations

INFOOPS are conducted during time of crisis or conflict to affect adversaries' information and information systems while defending one's own with the purpose of attaining military advantages. INFOOPS can be directed against information in any form, transmitted over any media, including operations against information content, its supporting systems and software, the physical hardware device that stores the data or instructions, and also human perception, attitudes and behaviour. INFOOPS consist of the underlying categories Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Military Deception (MILDEC), Operations Security (OPSEC), Computer Network Operations (CNO) and Electronic Warfare (EW).

Psychological Operations


The aim of PSYOPS is always to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviour favourable to the originator's objectives.

PSYOPS are planned activities in peace, crisis and war directed to enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. All target audiences are approved by the military COM and can at different levels consist of foreign governments, organisations, groups, and individuals. The messages are distributed by own or controlled civilian communication channels with the aim to influence the target audiences' emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of.


PSYOPS is in some communities considered a too aggressive name and are in some UN and EU-operations not allowed. Some countries also use a different terminology for PSYOPS like Operative Information (Germany) and Information Support (UK).

ANNEX C

UN Communication and Information System Levels



Example showing Battalion radio network



Abbreviations used in NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manual

2IC	Second In Command
ADL	Armistice Demarcation Line
AFV	Armoured Fighting Vehicle
ALO	Air Liaison Officer
AO	Area of Operation
AOI	Area of Interest
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AOS	Area of Separation
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
ATG	Anti Tank Gun
AU	African Union
Bde	Brigade
BG	Battle Group
Bn	Battalion
CAO	Chief Administration Officer
CAS	Close Air Support
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CFL	Cease-fire Line
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIM-COORD	Civil Military Co-ordination (UN term)
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CiO	Chairmanship in Office
CIS	Communication and Information System
CIVCOM	Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CLO	Chief Logistics Officer
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CMO	Crises Management Operation (EU abbreviation)
CNO	Computer Network Operations
CO	Commanding Officer
COA	Course of Action
COE	Contingent Owned Equipment
COM	Commander
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COS	Chief of Staff
Coy	Company
CP	Checkpoint
CPT	Temporary Checkpoint
CRC	Crowd and Riot Control
DCO	Deputy Commanding Officer

DCOM	Deputy Commander
DD&R	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
Div	Division
DP	Displaced Person
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ECM	Electronic Counter Measures
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EP	Environmental Protection
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
ETA	Estimated Time of Arrival
EU	European Union
EUBG	European Union Battle Group
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EW	Electronic Warfare
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FC	Force Commander
FHQ	Force Headquarters
FoM	Freedom of Movement
FP	Force Protection
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GO	Governmental Organisation
GPS	Global Position System
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HELO	Helicopter
HF	High Frequency
HLPG	High-Level Planning Group
HMG	Heavy Machine Gun
HN	Host Nation
HoM	Head of Mission
HQ	Headquarters
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IC	International Community
ICP	Incident Control Post
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent

INFOOPS	Information Operations
IO	International Organisation
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Space
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force " in Afghanistan"
ISS	Integrated Service Support
KFOR	Kosovo Force
LA	Local Authorities
LFA	Light Forces Area
LL	Lessons Learned
LNO	Liaison Officer
LOG	Logistics
LP	Local Police
LRP	Long Range Patrol
MBT	Main Battle Tank
MC	Military Committee
MCC	Mission Coordinating Cell
MCP	Mobile Check Point
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MILDEC	Military Deception
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Military Police
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMA	NATO Military Authorities
NMCG	NORDCAPS Military Co-ordination Group
NORDCAPS	Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support
NORDCAPS PLE	NORDCAPS Planning Element
NORDSAMFN	Nordiske Samarbedsgruppe för Förenta Nationernas Anliggander
NSE	National Support Element
NSG	NORDCAPS Steering Group
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
OP	Observation Post
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OPORD	Operations Order
OPP	Operational Planning Process
OPSEC	Operations Security

OPT	Temporary Observation Post
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PE	Peace Enforcement
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PIFWC	Person Indicted for War Crimes
PIO	Press and Information Officer
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirement
PK	Peacekeeping
PLE	Planning Element
Plt	Platoon
POC	Point of Contact
POL	Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
POW	Prisoners of War
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSF	Peace Support Force
PSO	Peace Support Operation
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PVO	Private Voluntary Organisation
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
RC	Resident Coordinator
RECCE	Reconnaissance
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SAR	Search and Rescue
SC	Security Council
Sec	Section
SG	Secretary General
SNR	Senior National Representative
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreements
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SR	Special Representative
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TA	Technical Agreement
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
TEU	Treaty of European Union
TO&E	Table of Organisation and Equipment
TOA	Transfer of Authority
TOC	Tactical Operation Centre (Coy or Bn/HQ)
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN	United Nations

UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force
UNEF II	Second United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNFPA	United Nations Population Funds
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNNY	United Nations New York
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VCP	Vehicle Checkpoint
WF	Warring Factions
WFP	World Food Programme
VHF	Very High Frequency
WHO	World Health Organisation
VIP	Very Important Person
ZOS	Zone of Separation

